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ABSTRACT
Gaffney, N. T. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2012. An Analysis of the
Cross-Border Acquisition Behavior of Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises.
Major Professor: Ben L. Kedia.
The emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China have been a major source
of cross-border acquisitions during the recent global recession, spurring the need for
increased scholarly investigation into the antecedents and characteristics of this form of
internationalization by Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs).
Furthermore, extant literature posits that new theories are needed to explain the EMNE
internationalization process as the behavior appears to be fundamentally different from
that of traditional MNEs from the developed world (DMNEs). This dissertation offers
empirical evidence on both accounts by analyzing all cross-border acquisitions by
publicly traded EMNEs from Brazil, Russia, India, and China for the last 11 years (20002010) and then comparing the findings to a parallel sample of publicly traded MNEs from
a developed country.
The first part of the dissertation builds on existing literature on EMNEs to examine
how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance (Administrative, Economic, Financial,
Political, Cultural, and Knowledge), as moderated by firm acquisition experience, affect
the likelihood of acquisition completion, the duration of acquisitions, and equity
participation. The second part adds a representative sample of DMNEs, to examine how
MNE classification (EMNE vs. DMNE) influences the relationship of the sub-dimensions
of institutional distance with the dependent variables.
Interestingly, there was no evidence found to show that institutional distance
decreased EMNE cross-border acquisition completion rates, counter to previous findings
iv

on DMNEs. However, many sub-dimensions of institutional distance were shown to
decrease EMNE cross-border acquisition duration. Furthermore, many sub-dimensions of
institutional distance increased EMNE equity participation. In regards to the moderating
effect of firm acquisition experience on the three dependent variables, there was minimal
support found in the study. With the exception of political distance, there was no support
for a statistical difference in how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance alter
acquisition completion for EMNEs and DMNEs. However, the sub-dimensions of
distance were shown to have significantly different effects on acquisition duration and
equity participation for EMNEs as compared to DMNEs. Thus, for EMNEs the effect of
distance on acquisition completion, duration, and equity participation may be less
negative or, in some cases, even positive, suggesting differences with DMNEs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Focus of the Study
Roughly 25% of all acquisitions are considered cross-border, in that they involve an
acquirer based in one country targeting a firm based in another country (UNCTAD,
2007). While as a whole acquisitions often fail to achieve value for the acquirer because
of issues with implementation and integration, cross-border acquisitions are even more
troublesome because of the potential for institutional differences between the two
operating environments. For example, KPMG found that roughly 17% of cross-border
acquisitions created shareholder value, while 53% destroyed it (Economist, 1999).
Fueled by industry consolidation, privatization, and the liberalization of economies
around the world, cross-border acquisitions have increased in frequency and value over
the last 20 years, leading to an increase in research on the antecedents, moderators, and
consequences of these decisions (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian, Devers,
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). A
vast majority of this research has focused on cross-border acquisitions by firms based in
developed countries (e.g., United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany). While
this research is warranted and beneficial, the last two decades have also seen an
increasing number of cross-border acquisitions initiated by firms based in the emerging
markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (i.e., Emerging Market Multinationals or
EMNEs). In fact, in 2007 EMNE’s share of cross-border acquisitions by value and
number of deals has grown to 13% and 17% of total global M&As, respectively, up from
roughly 4% and 5%, respectively in the late 1980s (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2010).
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Importance of the Present Study
During the recent global recession, an increasing portion of cross-border acquisitions
are being initiated by firms from the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and
China (UNCTAD, 2011). As EMNE acquisition behavior becomes more prominent, it is
important that we gain a fuller understanding of how the unique context of emerging
markets spurs this type of internationalization, as well as to determine if and how EMNE
acquisition behavior differs from more traditional developed country MNEs (DMNEs)
What makes EMNEs theoretically different from traditional MNEs is that their
comparative advantage is based on their latecomer status (e.g., as a low cost partner, not
seen as a legitimate threat by established MNEs, lack of legacy costs, organizational
flexibility) and the idiosyncratic nature of their home country (e.g., preferential access to
low-cost labor, capital, or government policy) rather than the firm-specific advantages on
which traditional MNEs rely (Mathews, 2002, 2006; Ramamurti, 2009; Rugman, 2009).
EMNEs use these comparative advantages in order to seek the knowledge and
capabilities to develop the firm-specific advantages that will help them become and
remain globally competitive (Kedia, Gaffney, & Clampit, 2012). Furthermore, EMNEs
have been argued to require a different explanation than the OLI Paradigm (Dunning
1980, 1988), because they have been argued to internationalize at an accelerated pace
(Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & Tung 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006).
What is interesting about the cross-border acquisition segment of EMNE
internationalization, is that EMNE acquisitions have been shown to be even less
successful than the cross border M&As of their counterparts from developed countries
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009). There is limited research explaining this phenomenon. Hope et
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al. (2011) found, on average, EMNEs (compared with those from developed countries)
bid higher to acquire assets in developed countries when national pride is a motivation.
However, Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, and Chittoor (2010) found that in the case of
Indian firms, cross-border acquisitions actually created value, especially when
investments were made in developed countries. Similarly, Zhang, Zhou, and Ebbers
(2011) found that Chinese cross-border acquisitions were less likely to be completed in
countries of worse institutional quality, industries sensitive to national security, and/or if
the target country is state owned.
Building on these and similar extant research, there is still a need to further explore
the determinants of EMNE cross-border acquisition completion and to determine if
EMNE cross-border acquisitions are truly more aggressive than typical cross-border
acquisitions. An important predictor of cross-border acquisition behavior (and
internationalization behavior in general) is the concept of institutional distance (Kostova,
1996). Institutional differences between the acquirer’s home country and that of the target
company often complicate the acquisition process and has been argued to decrease the
ability to successfully internationalize (see Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010 for a review)
and, more specifically, the chances of acquisition completion (Dikova, Sahib, &
Witteloostuijn, 2010). Furthermore, the EMNE internationalization literature (e.g., Luo
& Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006) is based on the premise that EMNEs are different
from traditional MNEs, thus there is a need for a direct comparison of these two
classifications of MNEs in different contexts to determine if this division is justified.
Institutional theory holds two important tenets for cross-border acquisitions. First, it
suggests that the institutional context of the home country will influence the strategic

3

orientation of MNEs originating there. Second, it suggests that MNEs must conform, to
some degree, with the institutional context of the host country to earn legitimacy (i.e., the
pressure of isomorphism). Thus, differences between the institutional frameworks of the
home and host country (i.e., institutional distance) are theorized to decrease the ability of
MNEs to successfully complete acquisitions and will increase the time it takes to
complete announced deals (Dikova et al., 2010). Including cultural dimensions in an
institutional analysis helps give a fuller understanding of the formal and informal
institutional effects on MNE cross-border acquisition behavior (Leung & Ang, 2009).
Thus, building on the recent work on institutional distance by Berry et al. (2010), this
dissertation explores how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance affect the
completion rate and duration of EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Furthermore, EMNE specific internationalization literature suggests that these firms
are more aggressive, proactive, and risk taking than traditional MNEs from developed
countries (Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006). These
perspectives suggest that the effects of institutional distance may be less negative, and in
some cases positive in effect, than what is found within a sample of cross-border
acquisitions by developed country multinationals. Specifically, it would seem that certain
dimensions of distance, in particular those that would help compensate for the
institutional voids said to be present in Emerging Markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2006),
such as knowledge assets and economic stability may increase acquisition
aggressiveness. Furthermore, as EMNEs look to acquire strategic assets abroad, they may
be prone to more aggressive acquisitions, though in institutionally distant locations
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009).
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Scope and Contribution of the Study
Institutional Theory, Internationalization Theory (including EMNE specific
theoretical explanations), and concepts of cultural differences may help to explain the
acquisition success, duration, and aggressiveness of EMNE cross-border acquisitions, as
well as differences from DMNEs. Specifically, building on the recent work of Berry et al.
(2010), this dissertation explores how sub-dimensions of institutional distance
(Administrative, Economic, Financial, Political, Cultural, and Knowledge), or the
differences between the institutional contexts of the home and host country, affect the
successful completion and aggressiveness of EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Furthermore, MNE specific internationalization literature suggests that EMNEs are more
aggressive, proactive, and risk taking than traditional MNEs (Luo & Tung, 2007;
Mathews, 2006). This suggests that on the whole the effects of institutional distance will
be less negative, and in some cases positive in effect, than from what is found within a
sample of cross-border acquisitions by developed country multinationals (DMNEs).
Thus, this dissertation builds on the limited existing research on EMNE cross-border
acquisitions (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Gubbi et al., 2010; Hope et al., 2011) to extend our
understanding of this phenomenon and by extension our understanding of EMNE
internationalization. By examining all cross-border acquisitions by publicly traded
EMNEs from the major emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China for the last
11 years (2000-2010), this work promises to offer a fuller and more integrated
understanding of EMNE cross-border acquisition behavior. Furthermore, by comparing
these findings with those based on a representative sample of DMNEs during the same
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time period, evidence is offered of if and how EMNEs differ in their internationalization
behavior from DMNEs.
The dissertation is broken into two parts. The first section builds on existing work to
examine how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance, as moderated by firm
experience, affect the likelihood of acquisition completion, the duration of acquisitions,
and the equity level sought during acquisitions (i.e., equity participation). The second
section adds a data set of DMNEs, to determine if and how the influence of the subdimensions of institutional distance on acquisition behavior differs based on MNE
classification. The intended contribution of these parallel studies is: (1) to offer a richer
and more nuanced understanding of when and how institutional distance affects EMNE
cross-border acquisition success and aggressiveness; (2) to determine if these effects are
different for DMNEs; and (3) add a richer evidence-based understanding to the
developing EMNE specific internationalization literature which has been largely
theoretical.
While it has been argued that classifying EMNEs into one group is useful because of
the large difference of this group from traditional MNEs from developed countries, I
argue that a closer analysis of the EMNE cross-border acquisition over the last 11 years
may yield important implications for the future research of this group. Furthermore, by
comparing the findings of this study of this sample with a parallel study of a sample of
DMNEs can further flush out potential differences between the two groups and further
clarify justifications that EMNEs are different enough to be treated as a separate
phenomenon by management researchers.
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Format of the Study
This section (Chapter 1) has introduced the context of the study, describing its focus,
importance, and intended contributions.
The next section (Chapter 2) will review relevant extant literature on Cross-Border
Acquisitions, the Emerging Market Context, EMNE Internationalization, EMNE CrossBorder Acquisitions, and Institutional Distance.
Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical rational of the study, creating hypotheses grounded
in the extant literature. Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology, including the
samples, measures, and statistical analysis. Detailed empirical findings of the study are
discussed in Chapter 5.
Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss the general findings of this study and highlight its
implications, limitations, and contributions. The chapter will also discuss future avenues
of research, based on the findings of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The number and value of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has reached
unprecedented levels in recent years (Barkema & Schijven, 2008), creating increased
research on the topic in a variety of academic disciplines such as accounting, economics,
finance, management, and sociology. As a whole this research has found that, on average,
acquiring firms most often fail to achieve desired returns and also tend to pay a premium
(Houston, James, & Ryngaert, 2001; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004; Moeller,
Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). As such most research in this area has strived to
understand why firms continue to engage in this behavior and what moderates the
acquisition-performance link (for a review see Haleblian et al., 2009). For the purposes
of this dissertation I will focus primarily on the antecedents of acquisition behavior that
have been examined.
Research on the antecedents of acquisition behavior generally fall into four
categories: value creation, managerial self-interest, environmental factors, and firm
characteristics (Haleblian et al., 2009). Acquisitions in the pursuit of value creation are
driven by a desire for market power (Kim & Singal, 1993), efficiency (Banerjee &
Eckard, 1998), resource deployment (King, Slotegraaf, & Kesner, 2008), and/or market
discipline (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, acquisitions undertaken by managers for
their own self-interest are generally seen as value destructing, and are driven by
compensation incentives (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), managerial hubris
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008), and/or target defense tactics (Bates & Lemmon, 2003).
Thus, a major research pursuit within the broader M&A literature is to determine the
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relative importance of these two broad antecedents in predicting acquisition behavior,
and, furthermore, may serve as a key explanation of why on net acquisitions fail to create
value (Haleblain et al., 2009).
Environmental and firm-level antecedents of acquisition behavior are getting
increasing attention in the M&A literature. Extant research on environmental factors has
focused on acquisitions as a response to environmental uncertainty (Schilling &
Steensma, 2002), regulation (Beneish, Jansen, Lewis, & Stuart, 2008), imitation (Stearns
& Allan, 1996), resource dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), and network ties
(Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). Research on firm characteristics as a driver of
acquisitions has focused on acquisition experience (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Haleblian,
Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006), firm strategy (Harzing, 2002), and firm position (Graebner
& Eisenhardt, 2004).
Cross-Border Acquisitions
Cross-border acquisitions have become more frequent over the last 15 years,
however, research on this topic has been somewhat limited (for a review see Shimizu et
al., 2004). Of the research that has been conducted much of it has focused on MNEs from
the developed world and whether these actions create value for the acquiring firm. Since
this diversification technique often fails to create value for the acquirer, the quest has
been to find and explain the determinants of this increasingly common phenomenon.
Roughly 25% of all acquisitions are considered international, in that they involve an
acquirer based in one country targeting a firm based in another country (UNCTAD,
2007). While as a whole acquisitions often fail to achieve value for the acquirer because
of the issues with implementation and integration, cross-border acquisitions are even
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more troublesome because of potential for institutional differences between the two
operating environments. For example, KPMG found that roughly 17% of cross-border
acquisitions created shareholder value, while 53% destroyed it (Economist, 1999).
However, the growth of cross-border acquisitions has been fueled by industry
consolidation, privatization, and the liberalization of economies around the world
(Shimizu et al., 2004).
Existing research on cross-border acquisitions has focused on issues such as entry
mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) (Andersen, 1997; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998;
Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Kogut & Singh, 1988;), entry
mode performance outcomes (Brouthers, 2002; Li & Guisinger, 1991), and stock market
reactions (Datta & Puia, 1995; Harris & Ravenscraft, 1991; Markides & Ittner, 1994;
Morck & Yeung, 1992). More recently, attention has been paid to post-acquisition
integration issues (Child, Falkner, & Pitkethly, 2001; Inkpen, Sundaram, & Rockwood,
2000; Olie, 1994), employee reactions to acquisitions (Risberg, 2001), post-acquisition
turnover of top management teams (Krug & Hegarty, 2001; Krug & Nigh, 2001), postacquisition performance (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999; Very, Lubatkin, Calori, & Veiga,
1997), and knowledge transfer and organizational learning (Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston, &
Triandis, 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).
EMNEs have been a major source of cross-border acquisitions during the recent
economic downturn (UNCTAD, 2010). The context of emerging markets has spurred
acquisitions, and internationalization behavior in general, that has been seen as
aggressive and defying traditional internationalization theory (Aybar & Ficici, 2009;
Gubbi et al., 2010; Hope et al., 2011). Before discussing EMNE cross-border acquisitions
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specifically, it is first important to discuss the extant literature on the institutional context
of Emerging Markets and their internationalization behavior.
The Emerging Market Context
Institutional theory is of growing importance in international business focused
research (e.g., Peng, 2003; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). It suggests that societal-level
institutions shape firm strategy in complex and changing ways (e.g., Dacin, Goodstein, &
Scott, 2002; Oliver, 1991, 1997). In particular, how EMNEs internationalize is
inherently shaped by the domestic and international institutional frameworks governing
these endeavors (Boisot & Child, 1999; Peng et al., 2008). The institutions of a given
society are often formed and supported by the broader national culture (e.g., Hofstede,
2007; Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2011; Redding, 2005). Thus, conceptualizations
of culture and the informal and formal institutions offered by institutional theory should
be integrated to gain a fuller understanding of the home country context and its effect on
EMNE internationalization, including cross-border acquisitions (Leung & Ang, 2009).
Institutions of Emerging Markets
Institutional theory at its core focuses on the importance of the interaction of
organizational practices with the larger social, legal and political context of the countries
in which they operate. From an economics perspective, North (1990) defines institutions
as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction”, and says they
consist of the “formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms
of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics” (p. 3); in other words, they are “the rules of the game” that dictate a
society’s incentive structure. Similarly, from a sociological perspective Scott (1995)
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defines institutions as “regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that
provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (p. 33). Institutions include the legal
institutions that formally regulate behavior in a society, financial institutions such as
those making up a country’s capital markets, and informal institutions such as currently
popular moral norms.
The primary institutional mechanism affecting organizations is isomorphism, a
process that compels organizations operating within the same environment to adopt
similar structures, strategies, and procedures (Deephouse, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Whether due to explicit laws or environmental
uncertainty that prompts organizations to mimic each other, institutional isomorphism
ultimately results in the convergence of thought and action within a given organizational
field, as firms who fail to conform to an environment’s prevailing rules and belief
systems may be viewed as illegitimate and, thus, denied access to key resources they
need to survive (Dacin, 1997; Heugens & Lander, 2009; Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995). In
other words, there is pressure on organizations to adopt business practices not because
they are necessarily efficient, but because they furnish legitimacy in the eyes of outside
stakeholders (e.g., lenders, government regulators, shareholders) in a given context.
The proposition that institutions matter is not controversial. The question is how,
and to what degree, they matter (Peng et al., 2008). While some have argued that a
background role is sufficient in advanced market economies like the United States, where
vital institutional frameworks such as rule of law can simply be assumed and taken for
granted. Increasingly, however, the direct impact of institutions on the firm has been
demonstrated to be worth actively considering as more and more evidence surfaces
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regarding the manner and degree of impact (e.g., Peng, Lee, & Wang, 2005). In
particular, within developing countries the existence of well-functioning institutions
cannot be taken for granted (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; McMillan, 2007). Instead,
institutions are often deficient, dysfunctional, directly opposed to EMNE strategies, or
even entirely absent (Brouthers, O’Donnell, & Hadjimarcou, 2005). Thus, Ingram and
Silverman (2002) state that “institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its
quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to create competitive
advantage” (p. 20).
Furthermore, the institutions of developing countries have been going through a
fundamental transition over the last few decades, having a profound effect on the
mentality of individuals within that society and how organizations within that society
must compete (Peng, 2003). The three most prominent changes in formal institutions
have been market liberalization, privatization, and OFDI promotion. Each of these has a
direct effect on the strategic orientation of EMNEs as well as an indirect effect on
individuals in that society (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008; Luo,
Xue, & Han, 2010; Mathews & Zander, 2007).
Culture and Institutions
Culture and institutions are often considered to be distinct and as such are
investigated separately (Earley, 2006). But institutions are themselves cultural in nature
(Leung & Ang, 2009) because culture can be seen as a “substratum of institutional
arrangements” (Hofstede, Van Duesen, Mueller, & Charles, 2002, p. 800) in that it is a
part of the informal institutions in the environment that underpin formal institutions
(Hofstede, 2007; Redding, 2005; Singh, 2007). Scott (2001) listed five distinct points that
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identify the characteristics of institutions: (1) Institutions are social structures that have
attained a high degree of resilience; (2) Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive,
normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources,
provide stability and meaning to social life; (3) Institutions are transmitted by various
types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts;
(4) Institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to
localized interpersonal relationships; and (5) Institutions, by definition connote stability
but are subject to change processes, both incremental and discontinuous. Implicit in
these five points is the notion that the values, beliefs, and norms most often attributed to
cultural variation between nations underlie the informal institutions of a society. Thus,
culture and informal institutions can be considered almost synonymous and be considered
in conjunction as an influencer behind the formation and structure of formal institutions
in a given society.
In other words, within a home country, culture and informal institutions often drive
behavior on the individual or micro level, which in turn influences the nature of formal
institutions and organizational behavior on a more macro level (Holmes et al., 2011).
Through this process, and similar to a structuration argument (Giddens, 1983), formal
institutions and organizational behavior reinforce culture and informal institutions in the
broader society, as well as employee mindset within the organization, respectively. For
example, some have argued that the cultural dimensions (beliefs, values, and norms) most
often reported in the United States are born out of its Puritan tradition and large portion
of the population that reports to be Christian. These cultural values often overlap with the
informal institutions of society and influence the formal institutions (legal and regulatory
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policy) of the country. In turn, the formal institutions of the nation help to shape and
constrain culture and informal institutions going forward. A similar process occurs
within organizations as the norms, values, and beliefs of organizational members
influence the organization’s strategic orientation, which in turn reinforces the norms,
values, and beliefs of its members.
Thus, the institutional context of Emerging Markets and the differences (or distance)
from the institutional context of developed countries has been used as a key explanation
of how and why EMNEs are internationalizing in a way that seems fundamentally
different than MNEs from the developed world (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006;
Peng, 2003).
EMNE Internationalization
What makes EMNEs theoretically different from traditional MNEs is that their
comparative advantage is based on their latecomer status (e.g., as a low cost partner, not
seen as a legitimate threat by established MNEs, lack of legacy costs, organizational
flexibility) and the idiosyncratic nature of their home country (e.g., preferential access to
low-cost labor, capital, or government policy) rather than the firm-specific advantages on
which traditional MNEs rely (Mathews 2002, 2006; Ramamurti, 2009; Rugman, 2009).
Furthermore, EMNEs use these comparative advantages in order to seek the knowledge
and capabilities to develop the firm-specific advantages that will help them become and
remain globally competitive (Kedia et al., 2012). In this section we will first examine the
asset-exploitation vs. asset-augmentation debate to understand how and why EMNEs
have been argued to require a different explanation than the OLI Paradigm (Dunning
1980, 1988). We will then examine three recent EMNE specific explanations – the LLL
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(Mathews 2002, 2006), the Springboard Perspective (Luo & Tung 2007), and the
Ambidexterity Perspective (Luo & Rui, 2009) – of their internationalization behavior, of
which, cross-border acquisitions is a growing segment.
Asset-Exploitation vs. Asset-Augmentation
Dunning’s (1980, 1988) OLI (Ownership, Location, Internalization) Paradigm is
perhaps the most widely known theory of the multinational firm. It explains how an
MNE can overcome the inherent costs and disadvantages of competing with domestic
rivals in a host country by using a source of advantage that maximally exploits
internalized asset transfers and access to global value chains. The three sources of
competitive advantage in this paradigm are: (1) the “ownership” advantage (for example,
an MNE might have developed proprietary assets in its home market, such as brands or
technologies, which can give it an advantage in the host market); (2) the “location”
advantage (for example, the MNE might be able to integrate activities across sectors of
the world with very different factor and/or resource costs, providing it with an advantage
in the host market; and/or (3) the “internalization” advantage (for example, the MNE
might be able to derive economies of scale and scope by reducing transaction costs
through internalizing activities).
Much of the rationale for FDI is based off this paradigm. Insufficient home markets,
global competitive pressures, and/or government policies often spur decisions to
internationalize from firms who, naturally, wish to protect or increase their profitability
and/or capital value. These firms then choose to engage in FDI (as opposed to exporting
or licensing) based on the belief that they can exploit existing firm-specific competitive
advantages abroad (i.e., asset-exploitation). The biggest criticisms of the OLI paradigm
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are that it does not capture new firm formation and early developmental processes or the
dynamic nature of gaining and sustaining competitive advantage (i.e. exactly the issues
that encompass the EMNE phenomenon), but rather focuses on large and well established
international firms in a static environment (Luo, 2002; Mathews, 2002, 2006). To combat
these criticisms, Dunning (1993, 2000, 2006) and others have offered several refinements
to the OLI to account for changing realities, but even Dunning (2006) admits that the
unique context of EMNEs may require a revised theory.
What is different about EMNEs is that often their primary motivation to engage in
FDI is to develop firm-specific advantages by gaining access to knowledge, resources,
and markets in the host country (i.e. asset-augmentation). However these two
perspectives (asset-exploitation and asset-augmentation) do not have to be mutually
exclusive. It has been suggested that firms that engage in asset-augmentation would only
do so on the belief that they could gain entry to a host country by exploiting an existing
competitive advantage, either the competency to seek assets or a home country-specific
advantage (i.e., market imperfections that give them preferential access to markets,
capital, or production capacity) (Dunning 2006; Ramamurti 2009; Rugman 2009).
Recently three conceptual frameworks have been offered which explicitly address
the specific motivations and processes of EMNE FDI.
The Alternative LLL Framework
The LLL (Linkage, Leverage, Learning) framework was proposed by Mathews
(2002, 2006) to extend the OLI paradigm to latecomer firms who are seeking strategic
assets. It suggests that international expansion in pursuit of new capabilities (assetaugmentation) requires a different framework than expansion designed to exploit existing
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capabilities (asset-exploitation). In other words, EMNEs are often latecomers to the
industry in which they compete, forcing them into accelerated internationalization with
the explicit goal of gaining access to assets, resources, or capabilities not found in their
home market (Mathews 2002). Since latecomers are generally at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
traditional MNEs, they must often complement the strategic initiatives of established
firms to gain a foothold in the market. The success of several early EMNEs in the high
tech industry (such as Acer, Samsung, and LG) is due to the fact that they were able to
link to established companies by offering services that were not beneficial for them to
keep internalized. Through these links, the firms were able to acquire knowledge and
competitive assets by leveraging their complementary resources. Repeated iterations of
this process allowed these firms to learn how to be globally competitive and adaptable.
These specific skill sets have proven to be a true competitive advantage for these
latecomer firms, and have led them to dominant positions in their respective industries
(Gupta, Govindarajan, & Wang, 2008).
The Springboard Perspective of EMNE Internationalization
Driven by their late mover position, global competition, rapidly changing
technology, and domestic institutional constraints, Luo and Tung (2007) propose that
EMNEs will systematically and recursively use international expansion as a springboard
to acquire critical resources needed to compete more effectively against rivals (both at
home and abroad), and to avoid institutional and market constraints (at home). EMNE
internationalization behavior is systematic in that steps are deliberately designed to
facilitate firm growth and to ultimately establish a competitive position in the global
marketplace. It is recursive in that activities are recurrent (e.g., one foreign acquisition

18

may improve an EMNE’s disadvantage in managerial expertise, while a later acquisition
might aim to improve logistics networks in the host country) and revolving (i.e., outward
activities are strongly integrated with activities back home). EMNEs will also try to
overcome their latecomer disadvantage through aggressive, proactive, and risk-taking
acquisitions. Furthermore, EMNEs are motivated to internationalize because they seek
both strategic assets (e.g., technology, R&D operations, operational know-how, and
managerial expertise) and opportunity in the hopes to bolster economic and social
development at home, and compensate for firm level competitive disadvantages globally.
The Ambidexterity Perspective
Luo and Rui (2009) propose that EMNEs often must pursue multiple conflicting
goals and strategies simultaneously in an effort to catch up with established global
competitors. Ambidexterity is a multidimensional construct including the subconstructs
of co-evolution (the firm and the environment effect each other’s development over
time), co-competence (leveraging both transactional and relational capabilities), coopetition (simultaneous cooperation and competition), and co-orientation (leverage
competitive advantages for short-term survival, while augmenting capabilities for longterm growth). For example, EMNEs must simultaneously balance the need to manage
globally (alignment of practices vertically with corporate strategy and organization
culture) with the need to manage locally (conformity to social, cultural, legal, economic,
political and historical characteristics of the host country to achieve legitimacy) in pursuit
of global competitiveness.
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A Unifying Theme and Need for Empirical Evidence
These perspectives – LLL, Springboard, and Ambidexterity – each suggest that
EMNEs differ from traditional MNEs in one key respect: the accelerated pace of EMNE
internationalization, in order to develop and/or acquire the capabilities necessary to
compete on a global level. Factors such as institutional deficiencies, non-competitive
industries, and/or a lack of a lucrative domestic consumer market push EMNEs to seek
capabilities outside of their home borders through aggressive strategic
internationalization that often targets mutually beneficial partnerships that provide access
to new knowledge and skills. The pursuit of these competencies often requires the firm
to pursue multiple goals and strategies, which often conflict, in an effort to achieve global
competitiveness.
Implicit in these three perspectives is that EMNEs are dealing with changing rules to
competition at home (i.e., institutional transitions) and are being forced to adapt in order
to survive. Thus their need to engage in proactive and risky investment in an effort to
catch up with established competitors. The effects of these shifts in the norms, values,
and regulatory environments of developing countries has been shown to have an impact
on the nature of organizational transactions (i.e., from relationship based to rule based)
(e.g., Peng, 2003), as well as on the mentality of individuals and firm level strategic
orientation (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008; Bruton, Ahlstrom,
& Li, 2010; Kreiser, Marino, Dickson, & Weaver, 2010; Luo et al., 2010; Mathews &
Zander, 2007).
Thus, these EMNE-specific internationalization theories suggest that EMNEs are
different from MNEs from the developed world because they more aggressive during
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internationalization, of which cross-border acquisitions are an increasingly visible form.
The question then is what antecedents influence this supposed behavior, and whether
there is empirical evidence that these antecedents differ between MNE classifications
(EMNE vs. DMNEs).
EMNE Cross-Border Acquisitions
In recent years, an increasing portion of cross-border acquisitions are being initiated
by EMNEs. In fact, in 2007 EMNE’s share of cross-border acquisitions by value and
number of deals has grown to 13% and 17% of total global M&As, respectively, up from
roughly 4% and 5%, respectively in the late 1980s (Hope et al., 2010). What is interesting
about this is that EMNE acquisitions have been shown to be even less successful than the
cross border M&As of their counterparts from developed countries (Aybar & Ficici,
2009). There is limited research explaining this phenomenon, with a few notable
exceptions, in that Hope et al. (2011) found, on average, EMNEs (compared with those
from developed countries) bid higher to acquire assets in developed countries when
national pride is a motivation. However, Gubbi et al. (2010) found that in the case of
Indian firms, cross-border acquisitions actually created value, especially when
investments were made in developed countries. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2011) found that
Chinese cross-border acquisitions were less likely to be completed in countries of worse
institutional quality, industries sensitive to national security, and/or if the target country is
state owned.
Building on these and similar extant research, there is still a need to further explore
the determinants of EMNE cross-border acquisition completion and to determine if
EMNE cross-border acquisitions are truly more aggressive than typical cross-border
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acquisitions. An important predictor of cross-border acquisition behavior (and
internationalization behavior in general) is the concept of institutional distance (Kostova,
1996). Institutional differences between the acquirer’s home country and that of the target
company often complicate the acquisition process and has been argued to decrease the
ability to successfully internationalize (see Berry et al., 2010 for a review) and, more
specifically, the chances of acquisition completion (Dikova et al., 2010). Furthermore,
the EMNE internationalization literature (e.g., Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006)
is based on the premise that EMNEs are different from traditional MNEs, thus there is a
need for a direct comparison of these two classifications of MNEs in different contexts to
determine if this division is justified.
Institutional Distance
The concept of institutional distance has been an important concept in international
research. Institutional distance can be defined as the relative difference between and
incompatibility of the institutional frameworks of the home and host country (Kostova,
1996; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu & Schenkar, 2002). The larger the
relative difference between the two, the lower the expectation that a MNE would be able
to transfer strategic orientations and organizational practices from the parent to the
subsidiary, decreasing chances of successful integration (Kostova, 1999). This is because
the institutionally dissimilar contexts make conflicting demands for external legitimacy
(or local responsiveness) in the host country and internal consistency (or global
integration) within the MNE system (Xu & Schenkar, 2002).
Furthermore, various proxies of institutional distance have been shown to affect
MNE cross-border acquisition behavior and success. For example, institutional distance
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has been shown to decrease cross-border acquisition completion rates and increase deal
duration in a sample of DMNEs investing in other developed countries (Dikova et al.,
2010). Proxies have also been shown to decrease the aggressiveness and equity level
taken during cross-border acquisitions by MNEs from developed countries (Pan & Tse,
2000), though this may not hold true for EMNEs (Aybar & Ficici, 2009).
One of the most common proxies of institutional distance is more accurately
described as cultural distance. The results of studies examining the effects of cultural
differences, points to the larger proposition behind institutional distance, that distance has
negative effects on MNE behavior and outcomes. For example, Barkema, Bell, and
Pennings (1996) found that the longevity of foreign ventures is negatively related to
cultural distance. Li and Guisinger (1991) found that acquisitions are more likely to fail
than wholly owned subsidiaries when cultural distance is high. Chatterjee, Lubatkin,
Schweiger, and Weber (1992) showed that larger cultural differences reduce shareholder
value. Datta and Puia (1995) found that cross-border acquisitions do not create value for
acquiring firm shareholders, on average, but especially in culturally distant acquisitions.
Furthermore, cultural distance encourages entry through wholly owned subsidiaries
rather than acquisitions (Brouthers & Brouthers, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Kogut & Singh,
1988). Similarly, Davis, Desai, and Francis (2000) found that firms from countries with
relatively higher quality institutions were more likely to invest in wholly owned
subsidiaries, while those from relatively lower quality institutions tend to invest through
acquisitions.
Traditionally, Xu and Shenkar (2002) have argued that institutional distance can be
measured along Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutions: regulative, normative, and
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cognitive. The regulative pillar is based on instrumental logic and uses legal sanctioning
to set, monitor, and enforce the rules. The normative pillar based in societal beliefs and
norms structure desirable goals and the appropriate means of attaining them. The
cognitive pillar stems from cultural orthodoxy and highlights internal representation of
the environment by actors. Conforming to these pressures earns the organization
legitimacy. While Xu and Shenkar (2002) use these dimensions to posit MNE location
choice and entry mode, institutional distance has also been shown to affect which and
how organizational strategies are implemented in the host country (Kostova, 1999).
Berry et al.’s (2010) recent review of the concept of institutional distance suggests
that there is a need to organize the research stream, as often authors use disparate proxies
of the notion of institutional distance, most often which is some variation of cultural
distance. As such, Berry et al. (2010) offer nine sub-dimensions of institutional distance
that are theoretically separate and give a more nuanced understanding of the concept,
which when employed by researchers can more accurately depict when, how, and why
institutional distance matters. These nine sub-dimensions are Economic, Financial,
Political, Administrative, Cultural, Demographic, Knowledge, Global Connectedness,
and Geographic. Another difference of Berry and colleagues approach is that they
measure distance using the mahalanobis method rather than the more traditional
euclidean distance that has been common in the literature. The major advantage of their
technique is that the multivariate distance measures are scale invariant and take into
consideration the variance-covariance matrix.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Institutional Theory, Internationalization Theory (including EMNE specific
theoretical explanations), and concepts of cultural differences may help to explain the
successful completion, duration, and equity participation of EMNE cross-border
acquisitions. Institutional theory holds two important tenets for cross-border acquisitions.
First, it suggests that the institutional context of the home country will influence the
strategic orientation of MNEs originating there. Second, it suggests that MNEs must
conform, to some degree, with the institutional context of the host country to earn
legitimacy (i.e., the pressure of isomorphism). Thus, differences between the institutional
frameworks of the home and host country (i.e., institutional distance) are theorized to
decrease the ability of MNEs to successfully complete acquisitions and will increase the
time it takes to complete announced deals (Dikova et al., 2010). Including cultural
dimensions in an institutional analysis helps give a fuller understanding of the formal and
informal institutional effects on MNE cross-border acquisition behavior (Leung & Ang,
2009). Thus, building on the recent work on institutional distance by Berry et al. (2010),
this dissertation explores how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance affect the
completion rate and duration of EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Furthermore, EMNE specific internationalization literature suggests that these firms
are more aggressive, proactive, and risk taking than traditional MNEs from developed
countries (Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006). These
perspectives suggest that the effects of institutional distance may be less negative, and in
some cases positive in effect, than what is found within a sample of cross-border
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acquisitions by developed country multinationals. Specifically, it would seem that certain
dimensions of distance, in particular those that would help compensate for the
institutional voids said to be present in Emerging Markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2006),
such as knowledge assets and economic stability may increase acquisition
aggressiveness. Furthermore, as EMNEs look to acquire strategic assets abroad, they may
be prone to more aggressive acquisitions, though in institutionally distant locations
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009).
Cross-Border Acquisition Outcomes
Investigating acquisition completion and acquisition duration is a relatively new
outcome variable within cross-border acquisitions (Dikova et al., 2010; Zhang et al.,
2011). While a relatively simple measure, the dichotomous completion variable is
important because unlike most outcomes that are post-acquisition (e.g., value creation),
completion looks at the pre-completion stage of acquisitions. This stage is important, as
Holl and Kyriazis (1996) found that up to 25% of announced acquisitions are abandoned,
which has real costs for companies (Luo, 2005; Rosenkranz & Weitzel, 2005). Similarly,
the duration from acquisition announcement to completion also is accompanied with
increased costs and negative perceptions.
Thus, while institutional distance has been found to decrease the chances of
acquisition completion and increase the acquisition duration in developed multinationals
(Dikova et al., 2010), EMNE specific Internationalization Theory would suggest that
institutional distance may not be as important to EMNEs, who are engaging in proactive,
aggressive, and risky acquisitions in order to catch up with established global competitors
(Luo & Tung, 2007, Mathews, 2006). Thus, it is important to measure how and when
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institutional distance affects the aggressiveness of deals, which can be measured in many
ways. A reasonable proxy that captures this phenomenon is the equity share of the
acquired firm sought during a cross-border acquisition (i.e., Equity Participation).
Equity participation has gained increased attention in the literature as an important
outcome in cross-border acquisitions, with variations of equity share sought in
acquisitions being driven by differing strategies (Chari & Chang, 2009; Chen & Hennart,
2004; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2011). While the entry mode literature has generally
treated acquisitions as either full or partial, and the latter as a form of joint venture
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Das & Teng, 2000; Hennart,
1991; Inkpen, 2001), the share of equity acquired in cross-border acquisitions varies
widely, with a significant number being partial and not full. The level of ownership taken
in an acquisition impacts many aspects of a firm’s strategy; such as control over the
venture, ability to transfer tacit assets, and risk exposure (Chari & Chang, 2009; Das &
Teng, 2000; Pisano, 1989). Furthermore, it is not clear that partial cross-border
acquisitions should be treated the same as joint ventures. Entry through partial
acquisition is not a greenfield venture like traditional JVs (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007;
Chen & Hennart, 2004).
Firms pursue different levels of equity participation in cross-border acquisitions
because of the perceived cost-benefit analysis of the increased control of higher levels of
ownership and the potentially reduced risk exposure of lesser ownership stakes (Inkpen,
2001). Shared ownership may increase the costs of partner opportunism, reduce the
firm’s ability to fully integrate the operations of the venture, and increase the difficulty of
transferring tacit assets (Hennart, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1993).
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Recently, the effect of differences between institutions and cultures of the home and
host country has been shown to affect the level of equity taken in cross-border
acquisitions (Malhotra et al., 2011; Morschett, Schramm-Klein, & Swoboda, 2010;
Richards, 2000). Malhotra et al. (2011) found that cultural distance had a curvilinear
relationship (U shaped) with equity participation. Chen (2011) found that firms were
more likely to opt for a larger equity share in acquisitions when they are trying to acquire
complementary capabilities. Interestingly, Chun (2009) found that when intellectual
property protection was low, firms sought higher equity shares in acquisitions so as to
protect their intellectual property.
The first part of the dissertation builds on existing work to determine if the
subcomponents of institutional distance, as moderated by firm experience, affect the
chances of EMNE cross-border acquisition completion, the duration of announcement to
completion, the aggressiveness of acquisitions, and the equity share sought. The second
part of the dissertation compares the EMNE specific findings, with findings based on a
sample of DMNEs from the same time period. If it is shown that the sub-dimensions of
institutional distance and the moderating influence of firm experience are different for
EMNEs than for DMNEs, it offers support for the notion that they truly are a unique
phenomenon worthy of separate study and potentially require new theory. Furthermore, I
extend studies using institutional distance as a predictor of internationalization decisions
by examining the phenomenon with the finer measures and sub-dimensions of
institutional distance as compiled by Berry et al. (2010).
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Institutional Distance and EMNE Cross-Border Acquisition Behavior
Overall, consistent with extant research on institutional distance an aggregate, blunt
measure of institutional distance will be assumed to decrease the likelihood of EMNE
cross-border acquisition completion and increase the duration of acquisitions (Dikova et
al. 2010). Similarly, institutional distance is assumed to decrease the aggressiveness of
EMNE cross-border acquisitions and decrease the equity share sought (Pan & Tse, 2000).
However, the effects of distance are more nuanced than can be deciphered through
an aggregate measure of institutional distance. Thus, I join Berry et al. (2010) in
examining specific sub-dimensions of distance in this new context to gain a fuller
understanding of how unique aspects of distance may affect the characteristics of EMNE
cross-border acquisitions. Six of their sub-dimensions are hypothesized to have a direct
effect on the dependent variables of interest (Administrative, Economic, Financial,
Political, Cultural, and Knowledge Distance), and a seventh is used as a control
(Geographic Distance). These sub-dimensions of institutional distance are empirically
verified and theoretically separate, and offer a more nuanced understanding of the
broader concept, which might more accurately depict when, how, and why institutional
distance matters in the context of EMNEs, and MNEs broadly.
Administrative Distance
Administrative distance is defined as differences in colonial ties, language, religion,
and legal system as determined by variation in the colonizer-colonized link, common
language, common religion, and legal system (Ghemawat, 2001; Guler & Guillen, 2010;
Henisz, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Lubatkin, Calori,
Very, & Veiga, 1998; Whitley, 1992). Berry et al. (2010) draw from institutional
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literature to identify the dimension of administrative distance. The authors describe this
as going “beyond national political systems to include both formal and informal
institutional arrangements that transcend the purely political nature of the nation-state.”
More specifically, it is refers to differential bureaucratic patterns attributed to language,
religion, colonial ties, and the legal system (Ghemawat, 2001; Henisz, 2000; La Porta et
al., 1998; Whitley, 1992). The authors follow extant literature in their operationalization
of each variable such that countries are viewed in terms of the percent of shared
languages and religions (Wolf & Weinschrott, 1973), and whether a colonial relationship
(Brocker & Rohweder, 1990), and/or a legal system is analogous (Guillen & Suarez,
2005; La Porta et al., 1998). These measures have been found to correlate with
geographic preference of market entry and the incidence of international mergers and
acquisitions (Guler & Guillen, 2010; Lubatkin et al., 1998).
In the case of EMNE cross-border acquisitions, a similar affect is expected. The less
history the home and host country have in common the harder it will be for the EMNE to
complete deals and the longer it will take. Furthermore, EMNEs will be less comfortable
with the target nation and thus less aggressive in behavior in these locations.
Hypothesis 1a: Administrative distance between the home and host country will
decrease the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition will be completed by an
EMNE.
Hypothesis 1b: Administrative distance between the home and host country will
increase the duration of a cross-border acquisition deal by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 1c: Administrative distance between the home and host country will
decrease the equity participation by an EMNE during a cross-border acquisition.
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Economic Distance
Economic distance is defined as differences in economic development and
macroeconomic characteristics as determined by variation in Income, Inflations, Exports,
and Imports (Campa & Guillen, 1999; Caves, 1996; Iyer, 1997; Whitley 1992; Yeung,
1997; Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997). Economic distance considers differences in economic
development and macroeconomic characteristics. This dimension has emerged, in part,
as a reaction to convergence theory (Dunlop, Harbison, Kerr, & Myers, 1975), which
proposed that the aggregate effects of economics and technology would drive countries
toward analogous patterns of work organization. Extant literature has suggested that the
global integration of markets and international diffusion of practices within MNEs will
weaken country level effects (Mueller, 1994; Ohmae, 1990).
Thus, Berry et al. (2010) calculate economic distance based on three indicators of
economic differences that predominate in the international business literature: income
(GDP per capita), inflation (GDP deflator), and intensity of worldwide trade (exports and
imports of goods and services). These have been shown to affect firm survival,
performance, and foreign market entry mode (e.g., Iyer, 1997; Yeung, 1997; Zaheer &
Zaheer, 1997). They also correlate with consumer preferences and purchasing power,
openness of the economy to exogenous influences, and macroeconomic stability.
While economic distance is typically assumed to deter internationalization behavior
and decrease outcomes of internationalization behavior, in the case of EMNEs, the effect
may be the opposite. Emerging markets are argued to have institutional voids, or
deficiencies in their formal institutional structure, that encourage internationalization by
EMNEs in order to seek safer environments for business (Khanna & Palepu, 2006; Luo &
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Tung, 2007). As such, institutional distance along the economic measures might actually
lead to an increase in the likelihood of acquisition completion and decrease the duration
of acquisition deals. Furthermore, because EMNEs seek to become globally competitive,
economically distant locations will attract EMNE cross-border acquisition behavior (Luo
& Tung, 2007). This desire and relative inexperience with cross-border acquisition will
increase the likelihood they will try and take greater control, through higher equity
participation.
Hypothesis 2a: Economic distance between the home and host country will increase
the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition will be completed by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 2b: Economic distance between the home and host country will decrease
the duration of a cross-border acquisition deal by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 2c: Economic distance between the home and host country will increase
the equity participation by an EMNE during a cross-border acquisition.
Financial Distance
Financial distance, or the difference in financial sector development, is comprised of
three component variables: domestic credit available to the private sector, market
capitalization (market value) of listed companies, and the number of listed companies
(Capron & Guillen, 2009; La Porta et al., 1998; Rueda-Sabater, 2000; Whitley, 1992).
Because countries have developed varying financial systems over time, there exist a
myriad of ways in which organizations fund their operations. Thus, differential systems
may marginalize a firm’s performance and serve as one mechanism by which listed
companies differ. Consistent with financial systems research among MNEs (e.g.,
Berglof, 1988; Steinherr & Hubeneers, 1994), Berry et al. (2010) use the three
aforementioned variables as indicators of financial differences across countries.
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Similar to economic distance, financially distant locations may offer EMNEs a more
secure and navigable location for cross-border acquisitions. Again, escaping institutional
voids would make EMNEs more aggressive in their acquisition behavior (Khanna &
Palepu, 2006; Luo & Tung, 2007). Furthermore, financially distant locations with their
more structured and consistent financial institutions will increase the chances the deal
will be completed and decrease the time it takes to complete the deal.
Hypothesis 3a: Financial distance between the home and host country will increase
the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition will be completed by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 3b: Financial distance between the home and host country will decrease
the duration of a cross-border acquisition deal by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 3c: Financial distance between the home and host country will increase
the equity participation by an EMNE during a cross-border acquisition.
Political Distance
Political distance is defined as differences in political stability, democracy, and trade
bloc membership. Berry and her colleagues (2010) disaggregate this dimension into
institutional checks and balances (consideration of independent institutional actors with
veto power), democratic character (democracy score), size of the state relative to the
economy (government consumption), WTO membership, and exogenous trade
associations (dyadic membership in the same trade bloc) (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003;
Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; Gastanaga, Jeffrey, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998; Henisz,
2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Whitley, 1992). Existing
research suggests that these variables correlate with the choice of entry mode and FDI
flows (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; Gastanaga et al.,
1998; Henisz & Delios, 2001).
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The recent attempt by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire
a crude oil refinery business in the United States demonstrates the sensitivity of national
governments to investments by foreign entities. This is heightened when the acquirer is
from a country that is perceived to be a threat to national security (Zhang et al., 2011).
Thus consistent with existing research, political distance will decrease the likelihood that
EMNEs will complete acquisitions and increase the duration of acquisitions. Similarly,
potential political backlash to investments will decrease the aggressiveness of EMNE
cross-border acquisitions in politically distant locations.
Hypothesis 4a: Political distance between the home and host country will decrease
the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition will be completed by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 4b: Political distance between the home and host country will increase
the duration of a cross-border acquisition deal by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 4c: Political distance between the home and host country will decrease
the equity participation by an EMNE during a cross-border acquisition.
Cultural Distance
Cultural distance is defined as differences in attitudes toward authority, trust,
individuality, and importance of work and family as determined by variation in power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity (Barkema et al., 1996,
Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 2004; Johanson & Vahlne, 1997;
Kogut & Singh, 1988; Whitley, 1992).
Cultural distance has been popularized by the introduction of Hofstede’s (1980)
cultural dimensions, described as “more often a source of conflict than of synergy.
Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.” Clearly, this dimension
has manifold implications for the way in which different cultural norms and values affect
MNE business practices, such as foreign market entry and entry mode choice (Werner,
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2002). Not surprisingly, cultural distance is ubiquitous in the IB and institutional
literature, with many studies considering its effect on foreign expansion (e.g., Barkema et
al., 1996; Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).
Given the widespread acceptance of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, cultural distance is
operationalized using uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, and
masculinity.
The results of studies examining the effects of cultural difference show it to have
negative effects on MNE behavior and outcomes. For example, Barkema et al. (1996)
found that the longevity of foreign ventures is negatively related to cultural distance. Li
and Guisinger (1991) found that acquisitions are more likely to fail than wholly owned
subsidiaries when cultural distance is high. Chatterjee et al. (1992) showed that larger
cultural differences reduce shareholder value. Datta and Puia (1995) found that crossborder acquisitions do not create value for acquiring firm shareholders, on average, but
especially in culturally distant acquisitions. Furthermore, cultural distance encourages
entry through wholly owned subsidiaries rather than acquisitions (Brouthers & Brouthers,
2000; Harzing, 2002; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Similarly, Davis et al. (2000) found that
firms from countries with relatively higher quality institutions were more likely to invest
in wholly owned subsidiaries, while those from relatively lower quality institutions tend
to invest through acquisitions.This should hold true for EMNEs, even if it is to a lesser
extent. Thus, when cultural distance is high, EMNEs will have a lower likelihood of
completing an acquisition, and the duration of such deals will be longer. Similarly, in
culturally distant acquisitions, EMNEs will be less aggressive.
Hypothesis 5a: Cultural distance between the home and host country will decrease
the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition will be completed by an EMNE.
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Hypothesis 5b: Cultural distance between the home and host country will increase
the duration of a cross-border acquisition deal by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 5c: Cultural distance between the home and host country will decrease
the equity participation by an EMNE during a cross-border acquisition.
Knowledge Distance
Knowledge distance is defined as difference in patents and scientific production as
determined by variation in the number of patents and number of scientific articles per 1
million population (Anand & Kogut, 1997; Berry, 2006; Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002;
Guler & Guillen, 2010; Nachum, Zaheer, & Gross, 2008; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993;
Shaver & Flyer, 2000). Focused on the capacity to innovate and create knowledge,
knowledge distance is a relatively new dimension of institutional frameworks (Furman et
al., 2002; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). Innovation, for instance, has been shown to not
distributed equally across locations (Florida, 2002), thereby affecting the distance
between countries. Indeed, Guler and Guillen (2010) argue that countries differ in terms
of the inputs allocated to the creation of knowledge, technology and innovation, the
quality of the institutions that help transform those inputs, and the resulting level of
performance. Furthermore, proximity to knowledge has been argued to influence foreign
location choice of MNEs (Berry, 2006; Guler & Guillen, 2010; Nachum et al., 2008;
Shaver & Flyer, 2000). In line with extant literature on national innovation systems,
knowledge distance is operationalized through the number of scientific articles and
patents per capita (Furman et al., 2002; Guler & Guillen, 2010; Nelson & Rosenberg,
1993). Articles and patents are widely used empirical indicators of the performance of
national systems of innovation (Furman et al., 2002; Guler, Guillen, & MacPherson,
2002; Kumaresan & Miyazaki, 1999; Niosi, 2002). Moreover, Guler and Guillen (2010),
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through extensive field interviews, revealed that many industry experts and venture
capital firms use scientific articles and patents as indicators of innovation in foreign
countries.
EMNEs in their search for strategic assets will be more aggressive in their crossborder acquisitions in countries with high concentrations of knowledge promoting and
protecting institutions. Furthermore, similar to the economic and financial distance
arguments, locations with more structured and consistent institutions that protect
knowledge accumulation will also make it more likely that EMNEs will be able to
complete acquisitions and decrease duration of deals.
Hypothesis 6a: Knowledge distance between the home and host country will increase
the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition will be completed by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 6b: Knowledge distance between the home and host country will
decrease the duration of a cross-border acquisition deal by an EMNE.
Hypothesis 6c: Knowledge distance between the home and host country will increase
the equity participation by an EMNE during a cross-border acquisition.
Moderating Effect of Firm Acquisition Experience
There is an extensive literature on how MNEs learn from and through acquisitions
(see Barkema & Schijven, 2008 for an extensive review). Existing research on firm
characteristics as a driver of acquisitions has focused on acquisition experience (Baum,
Li, & Usher, 2000; Haleblian et al., 2006), firm strategy (Harzing, 2002), and firm
position (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). Overall, this research suggests that prior
experience will improve subsequent acquisition performance. While generally,
performance is quantified in financial terms, recent work has suggested that performance
can be measured as deal completion (Dikova et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011). Thus, prior
experience with domestic mergers and acquisitions will change the effect of institutional
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distance in that it will increase the likelihood that deals will be completed and decrease
the duration of the deal process. Furthermore, merger and acquisition experience will
moderate the effect of institutional distance in that experience will increase the equity
share sought.
Hypothesis 7a: Acquirer’s prior Domestic M&A experience moderates the effect of
institutional distance on the likelihood of Acquisition Completion in that negative
relationships become weaker and positive relationships stronger as experience
increases.
Hypothesis 7b: Inversely, acquirer’s prior Domestic M&A experience moderates the
effect of institutional distance on Acquisition Duration in that negative relationships
get stronger and positive relationships weaker as M&A experience increases.
Hypothesis 7c: Acquirer’s prior Domestic M&A experience moderates the effect of
institutional distance on Equity Participation in that negative relationships become
weaker and positive relationships stronger as experience increases.
Prior experience with cross-border acquisitions will change the effect of institutional
distance in that it will increase the likelihood that deals will be completed and decrease
the duration of the deal process. Furthermore, cross-border acquisition experience will
moderate the effect of institutional distance in that experience will increase the equity
share sought.
Hypothesis 8a: Acquirer’s prior Cross-Border Acquisition experience moderates the
effect of institutional distance on the likelihood of Acquisition Completion in that
negative relationships will become weaker and positive relationships stronger as
experience increases.
Hypothesis 8b: Inversely, acquirer’s prior Cross-Border Acquisition experience
moderates the effect of institutional distance on Acquisition Duration in that negative
relationships get stronger and positive relationships weaker as experience increases.
Hypothesis 8c: Acquirer’s prior Cross-Border Acquisition experience moderates the
effect of institutional distance on Equity Participation in that negative relationships
will become weaker and positive relationships stronger as experience increases.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the proposed relationships described in hypotheses 1-8.
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EMNE Cross-Border Acquisition Completion, Duration, and Equity
Participation
Acquisition Completion
Institutional Distance
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Economic Distance
Financial Distance
Political Distance
Administrative Distance
Cultural Distance
Knowledge Distance

Acquisition Duration

Equity Participation
Controls

Sample: All cross-border acquisitions valued at
$5M US or more by publicly traded MNEs from
Brazil, Russia, India, and China from 2000 to
2010

Firm Experience
7. Domestic Acquisition Experience
8. Cross-Border Acquisition Experience

Year
Home Country
Industry Type
Firm Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition
Experience
Geographic Distance

Figure 1. EMNE Cross-Border Acquisition Behavior: The Role of Institutional Distance and Firm Experience (Sample: All
announced cross-border M&As by publicly traded MNEs from Brazil, Russia, India, or China from 2000 to 2010)
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Moderating Effect of MNE Classification
Again, what makes EMNEs theoretically different from traditional MNEs is that
their comparative advantage is based on their latecomer status (e.g., as a low cost partner,
not seen as a legitimate threat by established MNEs, lack of legacy costs, organizational
flexibility) and the idiosyncratic nature of their home country (e.g., preferential access to
low-cost labor, capital, or government policy) rather than the firm-specific advantages on
which traditional MNEs rely (Mathews 2002, 2006; Ramamurti, 2009; Rugman, 2009).
EMNEs use these comparative advantages in order to seek the knowledge and
capabilities to develop the firm-specific advantages that will help them become and
remain globally competitive (Kedia et al., 2012). Furthermore, EMNEs have been argued
to require a different explanation than the OLI Paradigm (Dunning 1980, 1988), because
they have been argued to internationalize at an accelerated pace (Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo
& Tung 2007; Mathews 2002, 2006).
Thus, these EMNE-specific internationalization theories suggest that EMNEs are
different from MNEs from the developed world because they more aggressive during
internationalization, of which cross-border acquisitions are an increasingly visible form.
The question then is what antecedents influence this supposed behavior, and whether
there is empirical evidence that these antecedents differ between MNE classifications
(EMNE vs. DMNEs).
While it has been argued that classifying EMNEs into one group is useful because of
the large difference of this group from traditional MNEs from developed countries, I
argue that a closer analysis of the EMNE cross-border acquisition over the last 11 years
may yield important implications for the future research of this group. Furthermore, by
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comparing the findings of this study of this sample with a parallel study of a sample of
DMNEs can further flush out potential differences between the two groups and further
clarify justifications that EMNEs are different enough to be treated as a separate
phenomenon by management researchers.
Specifically, one would expect EMNEs to be less deterred by institutional distance
when engaging in cross-border acquisitions than their counterparts from developed
countries.
Hypothesis 9a: MNE Classification moderates the effect of institutional distance on
the likelihood of Acquisition Completion in that negative relationships will be
weaker and positive relationships stronger for EMNEs than for DMNEs.
Hypothesis 9b: Inversely, MNE Classification moderates the effect of institutional
distance on Acquisition Duration in that negative relationships will be stronger and
positive relationships weaker for EMNEs than for DMNEs.
Hypothesis 9c: MNE Classification moderates the effect of institutional distance on
Equity Participation in that negative relationships will be weaker and positive
relationships stronger for EMNEs than for DMNEs.
Figure 2 graphically depicts the proposed relationships described in hypotheses 9a-c.
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Moderating Effect of MNE
Acquisition Completion

Institutional Distance







Economic Distance
Financial Distance
Political Distance
Administrative Distance
Cultural Distance
Knowledge Distance

Sample: All cross-border acquisitions valued
at $5M US or more by publicly traded MNEs
from Brazil, Russia, India, and China from
2000 to 2010
Parallel Sample: All cross-border acquisitions
valued at $5M US or more by publicly traded
MNEs from the UK from 2000 to 2010

Acquisition Duration
Equity Participation

Controls

9. MNE Classification

Year
Home Country
Industry Type
Firm Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition
Experience
Geographic Distance

Figure 2. The Moderating Effects of MNE Classification (Sample: All cross-border M&As by publicly traded MNEs from Brazil,
Russia, India, or China from 2000 to 2010, with all cross-border M&As by publicly traded MNEs from the UK added for the same
time period)
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODS
Data
Answers to hypotheses 1-8 will be based on an analysis of all announced crossborder M&A’s valued at more than $5M US from 2000 to 2010 by publicly traded MNEs
based in Brazil, Russia, India, or China (N = 626). Deal characteristics will be derived
from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Database for Worldwide M&As. Thomson
Financial SDC Platinum is the premier source of up to date information on cross-border
transactions from around the world and is most often used by investment banks to quote
prices on companies that are being investigated for acquisitions. It has also been used as
the source of deal information by numerous recent top-tier academic journal publications
focused on cross-border acquisitions (e.g., Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Chakrabarti, GuptaMukherjee, & Narayanan, 2009; Dikova et al., 2010; Gubbi et al., 2010; Hope et al.,
2011).
I will then add to the basic deal information 7 sub-dimensions of institutional
distance as designed and calculated by Berry et al. (2010), by year and country pair. The
two firm experience variables and additional control variables will be derived from the
Thomson Financial Market Intelligence reports for each acquiring company, which will
also be used to verify the accuracy of each reported deal. Brazil, Russia, India, and China
are the largest and most influential of the emerging markets, as defined by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), thus, are a representative
sample of the classification of Emerging Market Multinationals (EMNEs). For example,
in 2010, these four countries accounted for roughly 75% of net cross-border acquisitions
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of these type countries (UNCTAD, 2011). Furthermore, recent research found that
cultural distance had a curvilinear relationship (U shaped) with equity participation
(Malhotra et al., 2011), thus I test for curvilinear relationships with our continuous DVs
to further clarify the relationship.
To answer hypothesis 9a-c, I will add a parallel, representative sample of all
announced cross-border acquisitions valued at more than $5M US by publicly traded
MNEs from the UK from 2000 to 2010 (N = 2218). Again, deal characteristics will be
derived from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Database for Worldwide M&As.
The 7 measures of institutional distance will again be added based on year and country
pair. Each acquirer will then be classified as either an EMNE or DMNE, based on
country of origin. The UK is one of the largest sources of cross-border acquisitions, and
thus, can be argued to represent the behavior of Developed Country Multinationals
(DMNEs). Additional control variables will be derived from the Thomson Financial
Market Intelligence reports for each acquiring company, which will also be used to verify
the accuracy of each reported deal.
Measures
Independent Variables
Institutional Distance measures are operationalized as the dyadic distances between
acquirer nation and target nation using the mahalanobis method, which is scale invariant
and takes into consideration the variance-covariance matrix. Specifically, I will use six of
the disaggregated sub-dimensions of Institutional Distance proposed and calculated by
Berry et al. (2010). Table 1 details the underlying factors in each measure of distance
used, as well as the other measures used in this dissertation.

44

Table 1
Dissertation Measures
Measure

Definition

Source

Independent Variables
Economic Distance
Income

GDP per capita (2000 US$)

World Development Index

Inflation

GDP deflator (% GDP)

World Development Index

Exports

Exports of goods and services (% GDP)

World Development Index

Imports

Imports of goods and services (% GDP)

World Development Index

Private credit

Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP)

World Development Index

Stock market cap

Market capitalization of listed companies (% GDP)

World Development Index

Listed companies

Number of listed companies (per 1 million
population)

World Development Index

POLCONV

Democratic character

Political stability measured by considering
independent institutional actors with veto power
Democracy score

Size of the state

Government consumption (% GDP)

World Development Index

WTO member

Membership in WTO (GATT before 1993)

World Trade Organization

Regional trade agreement

Dyadic membership in the same trade bloc

World Trade Organization

Financial Distance

Political Distance
Policy-making uncertainty

Freedom House

Administrative Distance
Colonizer–colonized link

Whether dyad shares a colonial tie

CIA Factbook

Common language

% population that speak the same language in the
dyad
% population that share the same religion in the
dyad
Whether dyad shares the same legal system

CIA Factbook

World Value Survey questions on obedience and
respect for authority
World Value Survey questions on trusting people
and job security
World Value Survey questions on independence
and the role of government in providing for its
citizens
World Value Survey questions on the importance
of family and work

World Value Survey

Number of patents per 1 million population

USPTO

Common religion
Legal system

CIA Factbook
La Porta et al., 1998

Cultural Distance
Power distance
Uncertainty avoidance
Individualism

Masculinity

World Value Survey
World Value Survey

World Value Survey

Knowledge Distance
Patents
Scientific articles

Number of scientific articles per 1 million
population
Adapted in part from Berry et al., 2010
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World Development Index
and ISI

Table 1
Dissertation Measures (continued)
Measure

Definition

Source

Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience

Number of previous domestic acquisitions

SDC Market Report

Cross-border Acquisition
Experience
MNE Classification

Number of previous international
acquisitions
Home country level of development

SDC Market Report

Dependent Variables
Acquisition Completion

UNCTAD

Whether announced deals are completed

SDC Platinum DB

Number of days from announcement to
completion
Percentage of the Target company sought

SDC Platinum DB

Home Country

Dummy coded Acquirer’s Home Country

SDC Platinum DB

Industry Type

SDC Platinum DB

Deal Value

Dummy coded Acquirer’s Industry
Classification
Reported value of acquisition

Firm Size

Previous year net sales in US$

SDC Market Report

Domestic Acquisition Experience

Number of previous domestic acquisitions

SDC Market Report

Cross-border Acquisition
Experience
Year

Number of previous international
acquisitions
Calendar year of the deal completion

SDC Market Report

Acquisition Duration

Number of days from announcement to
completion
Great circle distance between two
countries according to the coordinates of
the geographic
center of the countries

SDC Platinum DB

Acquisition Duration
Equity Parcipitation

SDC Platinum DB

Control Variables

Geographic Distance

SDC Platinum DB

SDC Platinum DB

CIA Factbook

Adapted in part from Berry et al., 2010

Administrative Distance is defined as differences in colonial ties, language, religion,
and legal system as determined by variation in the colonizer-colonized link, common
language, common religion, and legal system (Ghemawat, 2001; Guler & Guillen, 2010;
Henisz, 2000; La Porta et al., 1998; Lubatkin et al., 1998; Whitley, 1992).
Economic Distance is defined as differences in economic development and
macroeconomic characteristics as determined by variation in Income, Inflation, Exports,
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and Imports (Campa & Guillen, 1999; Caves, 1996; Iyer, 1997; Whitley 1992; Yeung,
1997; Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997).
Financial Distance is defined as differences in financial sector development as
determined by Private Credit, Stock Market Cap, and number of listed companies
(Capron & Guillen, 2009; La Porta et al., 1998; Rueda-Sabater, 2000; Whitley, 1992).
Political Distance is defined as difference in political stability, democracy, and trade
bloc membership as determined by variation in policy-making uncertainty, democratic
character, size of the state, WTO membership, and number of regional trade agreements
(Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; Gastanaga et al., 1998;
Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Whitley, 1992).
Cultural Distance is defined as differences in attitudes toward authority, trust,
individuality, and importance of work and family as determined by variation in power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity (Barkema et al., 1996,
Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 2004; Johanson & Vahlne, 1997;
Kogut & Singh, 1988; Whitley, 1992).
Knowledge Distance is defined as difference in patents and scientific production as
determined by variation in the number of patents and number of scientific articles per 1
million of population (Anand & Kogut, 1997; Berry, 2006; Furman et al., 2002; Guler &
Guillen, 2010; Nachum et al., 2008; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; Shaver & Flyer, 2000).
Moderators
I operationalize the two moderating firm experience variables and the moderator of
MNE classification as:
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Domestic Acquisition Experience as the number of previous domestic acquisitions
conducted by the acquiring firm.
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience as the number of previous cross-border
acquisitions conducted by the acquiring firm.
MNE Classification is based on the country of origin for each acquirer and is
classified as either EMNE (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) or DMNE (UK) along
UNCTAD guidelines.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of interest have to do with acquisition completion,
acquisition duration, and equity share sought. These are defined as:
Acquisition Completion is whether announced deals are completed or withdrawn,
coded as 0 = Withdrawn and 1 = Completed.
Acquisition Duration is the number of days from announcement to completion, for
completed deals.
Equity Participation is the equity share percentage of the target company sought in
the acquisition by the acquiring firm as stated in the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum
Database.
Control Variables
The following variables will be controlled for to clarify the true influence of
institutional distance on the dependent variables of interest. These are defined as:
Year: Calendar year of the deal, to help account for economic shifts over time.
Home Country is the Acquirer’s Home Nation, coded as 0 = Brazil, 1 = Russia, 2 =
India, and 3 = China. In the second study, the following codes will be added 4 = UK.

48

Industry Type is the Acquirer’s Macro Industry as defined by Thomson Financial
based on SIC codes, coded as 0= Consumer Products and Services, 1 = Consumer
Staples, 2 = Energy and Power, 3 = Financials, 4 = Healthcare, 5 = High Technology, 6 =
Industrials, 7 = Materials, 8 = Media and Entertainment, 9 = Real Estate, 10 = Retail, and
11 = Telecommunications.
Firm Size: Previous year Net Sales in US$
Deal Value: Estimated value of the acquisition in US$
Domestic Acquisition Experience as the number of previous domestic acquisitions
conducted by the acquiring firm.
Cross-border Acquisition Experience as the number of previous cross-border
acquisitions conducted by the acquiring firm.
Geographic Distance is defined as great circle distance between the geographic
centers of countries (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998; Fratianni & Oh, 2009; Hamilton &
Winters, 1992; Wolf & Weinschrott, 1973). It is widely accepted as having an effect on
foreign investment and trade (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998; Hamilton & Winters,
1992; Wolf & Weinschrott, 1973), in that geographic distance increases the cost of
transportation and communication.
Statistical Analysis
To test the hypothesized relationships between the Institutional Distance dimensions
and the categorical dependent variable, Acquisition Completion, I will use a Binary
Logistic Regression Model. This will address hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a.
To test the hypothesized relationships between the Institutional Distance dimensions
and the continuous dependent variables, Acquisition Duration and Equity Participation, I

49

will use a Linear Regression Model. This will address hypotheses 1b-c, 2b-c, 3b-c, 4b-c,
5b-c, and 6b-c.
To test the hypothesized moderating relationships of Domestic Acquisition
Experience, and Cross-Border Acquisition Experience, I will add in the interaction terms
for the first two moderators on the first EMNE specific sample. This addresses
hypotheses 7a-c and 8a-c. The third moderator, MNE Classification, will be added into
the analysis of the expanded sample including the parallel sample of DMNEs. This
addresses hypotheses 9a-c.
While it would have been my preference to use Hierarchical Linear Modeling
(HLM) to test this multi-level data, the data is not properly nested. In other words, while
acquiring companies most often belong to one industry, they are not necessarily limited
in this regard. Similar logic holds true in the industry to country relationship. Recent
work in this literature stream has used the methods I propose and been published in top
tier journals such as Journal of International Business Studies (e.g., Dikova et al., 2010).
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrices for both the
sample of EMNE cross-border acquisitions which will be used to test the hypothesized
direct effects and firm acquisition experience moderation, as well as the full sample
(including DMNEs) which will be used to test the moderation of MNE classification on
cross-border acquisition outcomes. This section first highlights the overall findings of the
study and then, by dependent variable and independent variable combination, describes
the specific findings and support offered in Tables 3-20.
Overall, none of the sub-dimensions of institutional distance were found to have a
significant effect on EMNE acquisition completion rates. However, four sub-dimensions
- economic, financial, cultural, and knowledge distance - had a significant negative effect
on acquisition duration. Though the relationship between culture and duration was found
to be the opposite of what was hypothesized. Administrative distance had a significant
positive effect on duration, as hypothesized. Furthermore, economic, political, cultural
and knowledge distance had a significant positive effect on EMNE cross-border
acquisition equity participation, though cultural distance and political distance were
hypothesized to have a negative relationship. Figure 3 highlights significant findings in
relation to Hypotheses 1a-6c. Findings are discussed more fully in the coming pages.
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Table 2
Correlation Matrices - EMNE Sample

1
2
3

Variable
Domestic Acquisition
Experience
Cross-Border
Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration

N

Mean

Std Dev

1

626

3.38

5.17

1

626

3.03

4.46

.315**

626

85.64

148.70

4

Deal Value

626

390.99

1320.58

5

Equity Participation

612

73.87

6

Acquirer Size

587

7

Administrative Distance

8

Economic Distance

.149

2

3

4

.148**

*

**

33.19

.072
.165**

9295.54

25346.70

.380**

.147**

613

118.18

54.20

605

18.81

20.01

-.084*
.218**
.116**
.403**
.142**
.231**
.227**

.166**
.149**
.188**
.170**
.465**
.213**
.292**
.228**

574

8.77

7.44

10

Political Distance

546

4614.43

2469.24

11

Geographic Distance

613

7290.59

3910.96

12

Cultural Distance

475

14.37

6.69

13

Knowledge Distance

548

9.27

8.75

1
.220**

1

.063

-.032

.053

-.072

7

8

9

10

11

12

1
.278**

1

-.047

.233**

1

.084*

.450**

-.042

1

.059
.208**

-.074

.093*

.470**

1

.569**

.261**

.584**

.439**

1

-.069

.574**

.257**

.524**

.668**

.780**

13

1

.169
.120**

Financial Distance

6

1

**

.081
.168**

9

5

.010
-.077
.163**
.128**

1
.022
.095*
.109**
-.050
.001
.190**

.202**

-.097*
.154**

-.014

.192**

-.068

.192**

-.106*

-.080

.246**

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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.127

**

-.074
.226**
.128**
.146**
.125**

1

Table 2
Correlation Matrices (Continued) – EMNE & DMNE Sample
N

Mean

Std Dev

2844

3.90

5.15

1
.461*

2

Variable
Domestic Acquisition
Experience
Cross-Border
Acquisition Experience

2844

7.64

9.58

*

1

3

Acquisition Duration

2844

58.03

115.63

-.017

-.014

.028
.040*
.122*

**

.056
.095**

.098**
.170**

.012

*

.141**

.130**

-.048*

1

1

5

6

.145**

1
.208**

1

.008

-.011

.000

.007

1

.105**

.036

.005

.111**

.022

-.021

1

-.048*

.056**

.003

.206**

.068**

-.016

.434**

1

.264**

.064**

-.023

.078**

-.034

.200**

.469**

.180**

1

.082**

.037*

-.013

-.039
.073*

-.024

.042

*

-.001

.071**

4

Deal Value

2844

372.17

2400.09

5

Equity Participation

2790

82.34

29.94

6

Acquirer Size

2570

7471.14

21253.21

7

Administrative Distance

2752

99.18

51.79

.027
.096*

8

Economic Distance

2746

8.58

14.22

*

2

3

4

Financial Distance

2630

6.08

6.29

*

.141*

10

Political Distance

2632

1074.64

2132.28

*

.115*

11

Geographic Distance

2781

6038.73

4131.03

12

Cultural Distance

1915

11.82

8.28

13

Knowledge Distance

2671

12.65

13.32

*

8

9

10

11

12

13

1
1

.091*

9

7

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

53

.003

.246**

.155**

.197**

.291**

1

-.023

-.037
.225**

.049*

.278**

.429**

.564**

.250**

-.026

1

-.016

.229**

.069**

.165**

-.035

.357**

-.007

.293**

.575**

1

Hypothesis

Distance

Acquisition Completion
(a)

Acquisition Duration
(b)

Equity Participation
(c)

1

Administrative

-

+

-

2

Economic

+

-

+1

3

Financial

+

-

+

4

Political

-

+

-3

5

Cultural

-

+3

-3

6

Knowledge

+

-2

+

1. Curvilinear Relationship, Inverted U
2. Curvilinear Relationship, U-shaped
3. Significant, but opposite hypothesized relationship

Figure 3. Hypothesized Effects of Sub-Dimensions of Institutional Distance (Hypotheses 1a-6c)
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In regards to the moderating effect of firm acquisition experience on the three
dependent variables, there was minimal support found in the study. The sole significant
finding was that cross-border acquisition experience was found to positively moderate the
link between knowledge distance and acquisition duration, but this was opposite of what
was hypothesized. Figures 4, 5, and 6 highlight the lack of significant findings in relation
to hypotheses 7a-c and 8a-c.
However, Figures 4, 5, and 6 do highlight support for hypotheses 9a, 9b, and 9c.
With the exception of financial distance, there was no support for a statistical difference
in how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance alter acquisition completion for
EMNEs and DMNEs. However, all six sub-dimensions – economic, financial, political,
administrative, cultural, and knowledge distance – are shown to affect EMNE acquisition
duration differently than they do DMNEs. Similarly, with the exception of administrative
distance, the sub-dimensions were shown to have a significantly different effect on
EMNE equity participation than for DMNEs.
For the dichotomous dependent variable, acquisition completion, tables 3-8 are
designed in the following manner. Model 1 includes all the control variables. Dummy
variables are used for the Year, Country, and Industry control variables, thus for clarity of
presentation these specific factors are not shown in the tables. Model 2 adds the
particular sub-dimension of institutional distance. Model 3 tests for interactions between
the specific sub-dimension of institutional distance and the firm acquisition experience
variables – acquisition completion. Model 4 is based on the full sample, including the
representative sample of DMNEs, and tests whether acquisition completion rates are
affected differently by the sub-dimension of distance for EMNEs and DMNEs.
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Distance
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Cross-Border Acquisition
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No

Knowledge

No

No

No

Figure 4. Moderation of Acquisition Completion (Hypothesis 7a, 8a, and 9a)
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No
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No
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Figure 5. Moderation of Acquisition Duration (Hypothesis 7b, 8b, and 9b)
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Experience
(8c)

MNE Classification
Differences
(9c)
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No
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Yes

Political

No

No

Yes
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No

No

No
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No

No

Yes
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No

No

Yes

Figure 6. Moderation of Equity Participation (Hypothesis 7c, 8c, and 9c)
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For the continuous dependent variables, Acquisition Duration and Equity
Participation, tables 9-20 are designed in the following manner. Model 1 includes all the
control variables and the given sub-dimension of institutional distance. Dummy
variables are used for Year, Country, and Industry control variables, thus for clarity of
presentation specific factors are not shown in the tables. Model 2 tests for curvilinearity
in the predictor. Model 3 tests for interactions between the specific sub-dimension of
institutional distance and the firm acquisition experience variables, domestic acquisition
experience and cross-border acquisition experience. Model 4 includes the parallel sample,
and tests whether the sub-dimension of institutional distance has differing effects on
acquisition duration and equity participation for EMNEs and DMNEs.
Detailed analysis by dependent variable and sub-dimension of institutional distance
are discussed below.
Acquisition Completion
Administrative Distance
Table 3 shows the findings of the logistic regression analysis for the effects of
administrative distance on acquisition completion. The Wald Chi-Square for all four
models are significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that at a minimum the control variables
are important predictors of acquisition completion in EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Model 1 shows the control variables. Model 2 shows that administrative distance has
an insignificant negative effect on acquisition completion (β = -0.001) which does not
support hypothesis 1a. In Model 3, no evidence of moderation of the institutional subdimension by firm experience was found, offering no support for hypotheses 7a and 8a.
Furthermore, in Model 4, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect
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of administrative distance on acquisition completion for DMNEs and EMNEs (no support
for 9a).
Table 3
Administrative Distance and Acquisition Completion
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.001*
0.001***
-0.031
-0.053
-0.004***
0.001

0.001*
0.001***
-0.032
-0.056
-0.003***
0.001

0.001*
0.001***
0.057
-0.032
-0.004***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
0.069
0.038
-0.002***
0.001*

-0.001

0.002

0.003

-0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001
-0.001
556.184
138.007**
*

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Administrative Distance
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Administrative
Distance
CBA Experience x Administrative Distance
MNE Classification x Administrative Distance

Log-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square

188.514

188.411

187.512

59.000***

59.103***

60.003***

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 579; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2496;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Economic Distance
Table 4 shows the findings of the logistic regression analysis for the effects of
economic distance on acquisition completion. The Wald Chi-Square for all four models
are significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that at a minimum the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition completion in EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Model 1 shows the control variables. Model 2 shows that economic distance has an
insignificant positive effect on acquisition completion (β = 0.003) which does not support
hypothesis 2a. In Model 3, no evidence of moderation of the institutional sub-dimension
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by firm experience was found, which does not support hypotheses 7a and 8a.
Furthermore, in Model 4, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect
of economic distance on acquisition completion for DMNEs and EMNEs (no support for
9a).
Table 4
Economic Distance and Acquisition Completion
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.001
0.001***
-0.036
-0.045
-0.003***
0.001

0.001*
0.001***
-0.035
-0.046
-0.003***
0.001

0.001*
0.001***
-0.061
0.009
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.005
0.033
-0.002***
0.001*

0.003

0.015

-0.017

0.003
-0.004

0.004
-0.002
0.015
541.273
138.757**
*

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Economic Distance
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Economic Distance
CBA Experience x Economic Distance
MNE Classification x Economic Distance

Log-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square

178.581

178.512

175.424

56.586***

56.655***

59.743***

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 571; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2490;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Financial Distance
Table 5 shows the findings of the logistic regression analysis for the effects of
financial distance on acquisition completion. The Wald Chi-Square for all four models
are significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that at a minimum the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition completion in EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
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Model 1 shows the control variables. Model 2 shows that financial distance has an
insignificant positive effect on acquisition completion (β = 0.073) which does not support
hypothesis 3a. In Model 3, no evidence of moderation of the institutional sub-dimension
by firm experience was found, which does not support hypotheses 7a and 8a.
Furthermore, in Model 4, there is a statistically significant difference (β = 0.111, p <
0.05) between the effect of financial distance on acquisition completion for DMNEs and
EMNEs. This offers partial support for hypothesis 9a.
Table 5
Financial Distance and Acquisition Completion
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.001
0.001***
-0.036
-0.053
-0.004***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.028
-0.046
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.143*
-0.008
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.022
0.031
-0.003***
0.001**

0.073

0.027

-0.086**

0.025
-0.004

0.012*
0.001
0.111**
484.313
147.894**
*

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Financial Distance
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Financial Distance
CBA Experience x Financial Distance
MNE Classification x Financial Distance

Log-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square

158.120

155.821

152.828

62.340***

64.639***

67.632***

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 542; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2390;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Political Distance
Table 6 shows the findings of the logistic regression analysis for the effects of
political distance on acquisition completion. The Wald Chi-Square for all four models are
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significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that at a minimum the control variables are important
predictors of acquisition completion in EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Model 1 shows the control variables. Model 2 shows that political distance has an
insignificant positive effect on acquisition completion (β = 0.001) which does not support
hypothesis 4a. In Model 3, no evidence of moderation of the institutional sub-dimension
by firm experience was found, which does not support hypotheses 7a and 8a.
Furthermore, in Model 4, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect
of political distance on acquisition completion for DMNEs and EMNEs (no support for
9a).
Table 6
Political Distance and Acquisition Completion
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.001
0.001***
-0.052
-0.067
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.055
-0.072
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.051
0.008
-0.003**
0.001

0.001**
0.001***
0.017
0.024
-0.002***
0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001
0.001

0.001
0.001*
0.001
501.506
130.701**
*

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Political Distance
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Political Distance
CBA Experience x Political Distance
MNE Classification x Political Distance

Log-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square

149.968

149.609

148.526

68.108***

68.466***

69.549***

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 520; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2390;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Cultural Distance
Table 7 shows the findings of the logistic regression analysis for the effects of
cultural distance on acquisition completion. The Wald Chi-Square for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that at a minimum the control variables are important
predictors of acquisition completion in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. Model 1 shows
the control variables. Model 2 shows that political distance has an insignificant positive
effect on acquisition completion (β = 0.015) which does not support hypothesis 5a. In
Model 3, no evidence of moderation of the institutional sub-dimension by firm
experience was found, which does not support hypotheses 7a and 8a. Furthermore, in
Model 4, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect of cultural
distance on acquisition completion for DMNEs and EMNEs (no support for 9a).
Table 7
Cultural Distance and Acquisition Completion
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.001
0.001***
-0.018
-0.044
-0.003*
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.014
-0.043
-0.003*
0.001

0.001
0.001***
0.015
-0.010
-0.003*
0.001

0.001*
0.001***
-0.026
0.073
-0.002***
0.001

0.015

0.042

-0.023

-0.003
-0.005

0.004
-0.004
0.049

127.854
41.194

359.138
101.215**
*

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Cultural Distance
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Cultural Distance
CBA Experience x Cultural Distance
MNE Classification x Cultural Distance

Log-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square

128.416
40.632*

128.330
40.719

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 443; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 1737;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Knowledge Distance
Table 8 shows the findings of the logistic regression analysis for the effects of
knowledge distance on acquisition completion. The Wald Chi-Square for all four models
are significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that at a minimum the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition completion in EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Model 1 shows the control variables. Model 2 shows that knowledge distance has an
insignificant positive effect on acquisition completion (β = 0.019) which does not support
hypothesis 2a. In Model 3, no evidence of moderation of the institutional sub-dimension
by firm experience was found, which does not support hypotheses 7a and 8a.
Furthermore, in Model 4, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect
of knowledge distance on acquisition completion for DMNEs and EMNEs (no support
for 9a).
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Table 8
Knowledge Distance and Acquisition Completion
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.001
0.001**
-0.048
-0.089
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.043
-0.088
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
-0.048
-0.077
-0.003***
0.001

0.001
0.001***
0.056
-0.001
-0.003***
0.001**

0.019

0.024

0.016

0.001
-0.003

-0.004
0.002
0.013
515.468
132.145**
*

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Acquisition Duration
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Knowledge Distance
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Knowledge Distance
CBA Experience x Knowledge Distance
MNE Classification x Knowledge Distance

Log-likelihood
Wald Chi-Square

149.563

149.256

149.118

68.068***

68.375***

68.513***

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 516; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2414;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Overall, the findings in tables 3-8 offer no support for hypothesis 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a,
and 6a. In other words, the six sub-dimensions of institutional distance (Administrative,
Economic, Financial, Political, Cultural, and Knowledge) are found to have no
statistically significant effect on EMNE cross-border acquisition completion rates. There
is also no support for an interaction of firm acquisition experience and the subdimensions of institutional distance (Hypotheses 7a and 8a). Furthermore, except in the
case of financial distance, no statistically significant difference between the effect of the
sub-dimensions of institutional distance and acquisition completion were found, giving
only limited support to hypothesis 9a.
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Acquisition Duration
Administrative Distance
Table 9 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
administrative distance on acquisition duration. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that administrative distance and the control variables
are important predictors of acquisition duration in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.074, Model 2 = 0.073, Model 3 = 0.070,
and Model 4 = 0.067) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Dikova et
al., 2010).
Model 1 shows that administrative distance has a significant positive effect on
acquisition duration (β = 0.120, p < 0.01), which supports hypothesis 1b. To further
examine our findings for hypothesis 1b, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2
introduces the squared administrative distance term, but the findings are insignificant.
Model 3 shows no significant interaction for firm acquisition experience and
administrative distance, offering no support for hypotheses 7b and 8b. However, in
Model 4 we find partial support for 9b, in that there is a statistically significant difference
between our samples of EMNE and DMNE behavior in administratively distant locations.
Administrative distance increases acquisition duration for EMNEs more than for DMNEs
(β = 0.144, p < 0.01) as hypothesized.
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Table 9
Administrative Distance and Acquisition Duration
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

0.093*
0.034
0.051
0.092
-0.066

0.092*
0.035
0.050
0.093
-0.076

0.094*
0.034
0.119
0.098
-0.075

0.089***
0.105***
-0.031
-0.014
-0.002

0.120***

0.231
-0.111

0.273
-0.130

-0.054
0.025

-0.084

0.009

0.002

0.001
0.144***

2.247***
0.070
0.311

5.969***
0.067

Predictor
Administrative Distance
Administrative Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Administrative
Distance
CBA Experience x Administrative Distance
MNE Classification x Administrative Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.450***
0.074

2.378***
0.073
0.317

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 547; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2418;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Economic Distance
Table 10 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
economic distance on acquisition duration. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that economic distance and the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition duration in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.124, Model 2 = 0.125, Model 3 = 0.068,
and Model 4 = 0.068) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Dikova et
al., 2010).
Model 1 shows that economic distance has a significant negative effect on
acquisition duration (β = -0.132, p < 0.01), which supports hypothesis 2b. To further
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examine our findings for hypothesis 2b, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2
introduces the squared economic distance term, but the findings are insignificant. Model
3 shows no significant interaction for firm acquisition experience and economic distance,
offering no support for hypotheses 7b and 8b. However, in Model 4 we find partial
support for 9b, in that there is a statistically significant difference between our samples of
EMNE and DMNE behavior in economically distant locations. Economic distance
decreases acquisition duration for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β = -0.089, p < 0.01)
as hypothesized.
Table 10
Economic Distance and Acquisition Duration
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

0.098**
0.022
0.028
0.078
-0.091*

0.101**
0.021
0.025
0.074
-0.062

0.099**
0.021
0.030
0.060
-0.064

0.088***
0.104***
-0.016
-0.025
-0.001

-0.132***

-0.274
0.149

-0.282
0.149

0.034
-0.028

-0.010
0.024

-0.044
0.044
-0.089**

2.200***
0.068
0.085

6.015***
0.068

Predictor
Economic Distance
Economic Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Economic Distance
CBA Experience x Economic Distance
MNE Classification x Economic Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.399***
0.124

2.345***
0.125
0.747

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 541; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2414;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Financial Distance
Table 11 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
financial distance on acquisition duration. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that financial distance and the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition duration in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.070, Model 2 = 0.070, Model 3 = 0.071,
and Model 4 = 0.076) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Dikova et
al., 2010).
Model 1 shows that financial distance has a significant negative effect on acquisition
duration (β = -0.124, p < 0.05), which supports hypothesis 3b. To further examine our
findings for hypothesis 3b, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2 introduces the
squared financial distance term, but the findings are insignificant. Model 3 shows no
significant interaction for firm acquisition experience and financial distance, offering no
support for hypotheses 7b and 8b. However, in Model 4 we find partial support for 9b, in
that there is a statistically significant difference between our samples of EMNE and
DMNE behavior in financially distant locations. Financial distance decreases acquisition
duration for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β = -0.185, p < 0.01) as hypothesized.
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Table 11
Financial Distance and Acquisition Duration
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

0.111**
0.042
0.014
0.018
-0.077

0.110**
0.045
0.016
0.022
-0.067

0.103**
0.036
-0.037
-0.030
-0.073

0.090***
0.116***
-0.040
-0.042
-0.005

-0.124**

-0.207**
0.100

-0.318***
0.167

0.009
0.064

0.073
0.084

0.014
0.026
-0.185***

2.193***
0.071
1.397

6.434***
0.076

Predictor
Financial Distance
Financial Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Financial Distance
CBA Experience x Financial Distance
MNE Classification x Financial Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.278***
0.070

2.241***
0.070
1.110

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 514; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2320;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Political Distance
Table 12 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
political distance on acquisition duration. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that political distance and the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition duration in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.062, Model 2 = 0.060, Model 3 = 0.063,
and Model 4 = 0.063) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Dikova et
al., 2010).
Model 1 shows that political distance has a positive but insignificant effect on
acquisition duration (β = 0.004) which does not support hypothesis 4b. To further
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examine our findings for hypothesis 4b, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2
introduces the squared political distance term, but the findings are insignificant. Model 3
shows no significant interaction for firm acquisition experience and political distance,
offering no support for hypotheses 7b and 8b. However, in Model 4 we find partial
support for 9b, in that there is a statistically significant difference between our samples of
EMNE and DMNE behavior in politically distant locations. Political distance decreases
acquisition duration for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β = -0.091, p < 0.05) as
hypothesized.
Table 12
Political Distance and Acquisition Duration
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

0.104**
0.036
0.035
0.040
-0.132**

0.104**
0.036
0.035
0.040
-0.133**

0.101*
0.033
0.143
-0.048
-0.137**

0.085***
0.104***
-0.027
-0.028
0.007

0.004

0.025
-0.018

0.029
-0.022

-0.262
0.126

-0.133
0.107

0.001
0.041
-0.091**

1.997***
0.063
1.617

5.613***
0.063
1.128

Predictor
Political Distance
Political Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Political Distance
CBA Experience x Political Distance
MNE Classification x Political Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.088***
0.062

2.017***
0.060
0.009

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 492; DMNE Included (Model) 4: N = 2320;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Cultural Distance
Table 13 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
cultural distance on acquisition duration. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that cultural distance and the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition duration in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.092, Model 2 = 0.091, Model 3 = 0.099,
and Model 4 = 0.069) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Dikova et
al., 2010).
Model 1 shows that cultural distance has a significant negative effect on acquisition
duration (β = -0.133, p < 0.05), but this is the opposite of what was hypothesized in 5b.
To further examine our findings for hypothesis 5b, we test for a curvilinear relationship.
Model 2 introduces the squared cultural distance term, but the findings are insignificant.
Model 3 shows no significant interaction for firm acquisition experience and cultural
distance, offering no support for hypotheses 7b and 8b. However, in Model 4 we find
support for the reverse of our hypothesized relationship in 9b. While there is a
statistically significant difference between our samples of EMNE and DMNE behavior in
culturally distant locations, cultural distance decreases acquisition duration for EMNEs
more than for DMNEs (β = -0.182, p < 0.01), which is the opposite of what was
hypothesized.
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Table 13
Cultural Distance and Acquisition Duration
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

0.180***
0.024
-0.022
0.051
-0.022

0.182***
0.028
-0.021
0.048
-0.015

0.171***
0.023
-0.185
0.020
-0.018

0.090***
0.122***
-0.039
-0.052
0.029

-0.133**

-0.241
0.107

-0.434**
0.208

0.146
-0.144

0.196*
0.047

0.009
0.042
-0.182***

2.407***
0.099
2.729*

4.585***
0.069

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

Predictor
Cultural Distance
Cultural Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Cultural Distance
CBA Experience x Cultural Distance
MNE Classification x Cultural Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.430***
0.092

2.366***
0.091
0.520

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 422; DMNE Sample (Model 4): N = 1686;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Knowledge Distance
Table 14 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
knowledge distance on acquisition duration. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that knowledge distance and the control variables are
important predictors of acquisition duration in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.062, Model 2 = 0.073, Model 3 = 0.081,
and Model 4 = 0.065) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Dikova et
al., 2010).
Model 1 shows that knowledge distance has a negative, but insignificant effect on
acquisition duration (β = -0.033) offering no support hypothesis 6b. To further examine
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our findings for hypothesis 6b, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2 introduces
the squared knowledge distance term. The knowledge distance coefficient is negative (β
= -0.486, p < 0.05) with the squared knowledge distance coefficient positive (β = -0.483,
p < 0.05). This shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between knowledge distance
and acquisition duration. This finding offers partial support to our hypothesis 6b, in that
acquisition duration does decrease in knowledge distant locations to a point, but then
sharply increases as knowledge distance climbs from moderate to high levels. Model 3
tests for interaction for firm acquisition experience and knowledge distance. While
domestic acquisition experience is found to be an insignificant moderator, cross-border
acquisition experience positively moderates the relationship between knowledge distance
and acquisition duration (β = 0.168, p < 0.05). This suggests that as EMNEs gain more
cross-border acquisition experience, differences between the home and host country
increases the duration of completed deals. Thus hypothesis 7b is not supported, but 8b is
partially supported by these findings. Furthermore, in Model 4 we find partial support for
9b, in that there is a statistically significant difference between our samples of EMNE and
DMNE behavior in knowledge distant locations. Knowledge distance decreases
acquisition duration for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β = -0.092, p < 0.05) as
hypothesized.
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Table 14
Knowledge Distance and Acquisition Duration
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

0.099*
0.041
0.065
0.013
-0.102*

0.102*
0.057
0.072
0.003
-0.138**

0.093*
0.051
0.076
-0.070
-0.139**

0.086***
0.112***
-0.032
-0.007
0.018

-0.033

-0.486**
0.483**

-0.587***
0.513***

0.165
-0.181

-0.050
0.168**

0.028
-0.026
-0.092**

2.299***
0.081
2.957*

5.673***
0.065

Predictor
Knowledge Distance
Knowledge Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Knowledge Distance
CBA Experience x Knowledge Distance
MNE Classification x Knowledge Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.069***
0.062

2.237***
0.073
6.542**

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 488; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2342;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Equity Participation
Administrative Distance
Table 15 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
administrative distance on equity participation. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that administrative distance and the control variables
are important predictors of equity participation in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.125, Model 2 = 0.126, Model 3 = 0.124,
and Model 4 = 0.131) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Malhotra et
al., 2011).
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Model 1 shows that administrative distance has an insignificant effect on equity
participation (β = -0.013), which does not support hypothesis 1c. To further examine our
findings for hypothesis 1c, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2 introduces the
squared distance term, but the findings are insignificant. In Model 3, we did not find any
evidence of moderation of the institutional sub-dimension by firm acquisition experience,
offering no support for hypotheses 7c and 8c. Furthermore, in Model 4, there is no
statistically significant difference between the effect of administrative distance on equity
participation for DMNEs and EMNEs, offering no support for hypotheses 9c.
Table 15
Administrative Distance and Equity Participation
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

-0.114**
0.075*
-0.008
-0.046
0.100**

-0.112**
0.073*
-0.005
-0.049
0.121**

-0.116**
0.074*
-0.076
-0.007
0.120**

-0.147***
0.067***
0.062
-0.111**
0.009

0.013

-0.219
0.231

-0.220
0.227

0.120
-0.074

0.092

-0.028

-0.056

-0.027
-0.037

3.412***
0.124
0.413

11.525***
0.131
0.448

Predictor
Administrative Distance
Administrative Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Administrative
Distance
CBA Experience x Administrative Distance
MNE Classification x Administrative Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

3.678***
0.125

3.614***
0.126
1.564

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 565; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2446;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Economic Distance
Table 16 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
economic distance on equity participation. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that economic distance and the control variables are
important predictors of equity participation in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.125, Model 2 = 0.147, Model 3 = 0.151,
and Model 4 = 0.143) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Malhotra et
al., 2011).
In Model 1, economic distance has a positive, but insignificant effect on equity
participation (β = 0.034), which does not support hypothesis 2c. To further examine our
findings for hypothesis 2c, we test for a curvilinear relationship between economic
distance and equity participation. Model 2 introduces the squared economic distance
term. The economic distance coefficient is positive (β = 0.631, p < 0.01) with the squared
economic distance coefficient negative (β = -0.627, p < 0.01). This shows that there is an
inverted U relationship between economic distance and equity participation. This finding
offers partial support to our hypothesis, in that equity share does have a positive
relationship with economic distance to a point, but then becomes sharply negative as the
level of economic distance climbs from moderate to high levels. Model 3 shows that
domestic acquisition experience has a positive effect on equity participation in
economically distant locations (β = 0.094, p < 0.10), which offers partial support for 7c.
However, the interaction between cross-border acquisition experience and this subdimension is insignificant, which does not support 8c. Furthermore, in Model 4 we find
partial support for 9c, in that there is a statistically significant difference between our
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samples of EMNE and DMNE behavior in economically distant lands. Economic
distance increases equity participation for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β = 0.143, p <
0.01) as hypothesized.
Table 16
Economic Distance and Equity Participation
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

-0.110**
0.074*
-0.003
-0.052
0.098**

-0.121***
0.079*
0.011
-0.032
-0.020

-0.119**
0.075*
-0.040
0.017
-0.010

-0.143***
0.063***
-0.004
-0.098***
0.024

0.034

0.631***
-0.627***

0.580***
-0.571***

-0.235***
0.083

0.094*
-0.086

0.104***
-0.078**
0.143***

3.990***
0.151
2.209

12.649***
0.143

Predictor
Economic Distance
Economic Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Economic Distance
CBA Experience x Economic Distance
MNE Classification x Economic Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

3.652***
0.125

4.087***
0.147
14.362***

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 558; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2441;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Financial Distance
Table 17 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
financial distance on equity participation. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that financial distance and the control variables are
important predictors of equity participation in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.121, Model 2 = 0.120, Model 3 = 0.121,
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and Model 4 = 0.166) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Malhotra et
al., 2011).
In Model 1, financial distance has a positive, but insignificant effect on equity
participation (β = 0.058), which does not support hypothesis 3c. To further examine our
findings for hypothesis 3c, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2 introduces the
squared financial distance term, but the findings are insignificant. Model 3 shows no
significant interaction for firm acquisition experience and financial distance, offering no
support for hypotheses 7c and 8c. However, in Model 4 we find partial support for 9c, in
that there is a statistically significant difference between our samples of EMNE and
DMNE behavior in financially distant locations. Financial distance increases equity
participation for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β = 0.292, p < 0.01) as hypothesized.
Table 17
Financial Distance and Equity Participation
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

-0.115**
0.079*
0.028
-0.052
0.077*

-0.115**
0.077*
0.028
-0.054
0.073

-0.116**
0.074*
0.112
-0.133*
0.072

-0.133***
0.061***
0.054*
-0.180***
0.019

0.058

0.092
-0.040

0.071
-0.004

-0.315***
0.023

-0.120
0.098

-0.026
0.091**
0.292***

3.207***
0.121
1.383

14.302***
0.166

Predictor
Financial Distance
Financial Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Financial Distance
CBA Experience x Financial Distance
MNE Classification x Financial Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

3.428***
0.121

3.319***
0.120
0.201

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 529; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2342;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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Political Distance
Table 18 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
political distance on equity participation. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that political distance and the control variables are
important predictors of equity participation in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.164, Model 2 = 0.172, Model 3 = 0.170,
and Model 4 = 0.145) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Malhotra et
al., 2011).
In Model 1, political distance has a positive significant effect on equity participation
(β = 0.180, p < 0.05), which is the opposite of hypothesis 4c. To further examine our
findings for hypothesis 4c, we test for a curvilinear relationship between political
distance and equity participation. Model 2 introduces the squared political distance term.
The political distance coefficient is positive (β = 0.658, p < 0.01) with the squared
political distance coefficient negative (β = -0.410, p < 0.05). This shows that there is an
inverted U relationship between political distance and equity participation. Model 3
doesn’t offer support for firm acquisition experience moderating the effects of political
distance on equity participation, offering no support for hypotheses 7c and 8c. However,
in Model 4 we find partial support for 9c, in that there is a statistically significant
difference between our samples of EMNE and DMNE behavior in politically distant
lands. Political distance increases equity participation for EMNEs more than for DMNEs
(β = 0.156, p < 0.01) as hypothesized.
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Table 18
Political Distance and Equity Participation
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

-0.113**
0.077*
-0.028
-0.038
0.086*

-0.119**
0.075*
-0.027
-0.036
0.068

-0.117**
0.078*
-0.059
0.037
0.073

-0.150***
0.064**
0.039
-0.130***
-0.021

0.180**

0.658***
-0.410**

0.750***
-0.465**

0.770***
-0.363***

0.040
-0.085

-0.012
-0.001
0.156***

4.157***
0.170
0.634

12.664***
0.145

Predictor
Political Distance
Political Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Political Distance
CBA Experience x Political Distance
MNE Classification x Political Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

4.322***
0.164

4.391***
0.172
5.283**

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 508; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2343;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Cultural Distance
Table 19 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
cultural distance on equity participation. The F-statistics for all four models are
significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that cultural distance and the control variables are
important predictors of equity participation in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.118, Model 2 = 0.121, Model 3 = 0.117,
and Model 4 = 0.186) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Malhotra et
al., 2011).
In Model 1, cultural distance has a positive significant effect on equity participation
(β = 0.119, p < 0.05), which is the opposite of what was hypothesized in 5c. To further
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examine our findings for hypothesis 5c, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2
introduces the squared cultural distance term, but the findings are insignificant. Model 3
doesn’t offer support for firm acquisition experience moderating the effects of cultural
distance on equity participation, offering no support for hypotheses 7c and 8c. However, in
Model 4 shows evidence of a significant relationship, but in the opposite direction of
what we hypothesized in 9c. Cultural distance increases equity participation for EMNEs
more than for DMNEs (β = 0.414, p < 0.01).
Table 19
Cultural Distance and Equity Participation
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

-0.120**
0.081*
0.089
-0.039
0.011

-0.124**
0.077
0.087
-0.033
-0.002

-0.122**
0.079
0.122
-0.029
-0.001

-0.140***
0.052**
0.090**
-0.077
-0.081***

0.119**

0.328**
-0.210

0.365**
-0.229

-0.541***
0.336***

-0.042
-0.007

-0.082*
-0.024
0.414***

2.729***
0.117
0.114

12.073***
0.186

Predictor
Cultural Distance
Cultural Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Cultural Distance
CBA Experience x Cultural Distance
MNE Classification x Cultural Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

2.929***
0.118

2.910***
0.121
2.104

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 432; DMNE Sample (Model 4): N = 1699;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.

Knowledge Distance
Table 20 shows the findings of the fixed-effect regression analysis for the effects of
knowledge distance on equity participation. The F-statistics for all four models are
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significant at p < 0.001, suggesting that knowledge distance and the control variables are
important predictors of equity participation in EMNE cross-border acquisitions. The
Adjusted R2 values of the models (Model 1 = 0.163, Model 2 = 0.165, Model 3 = 0.161,
and Model 4 = 0.185) are slightly less, but in line with extant literature (e.g., Malhotra et
al., 2011).
In Model 1, knowledge distance has a positive significant effect on equity
participation (β = 0.160, p < 0.01), which supports hypothesis 6c. To further examine our
findings for hypothesis 6c, we test for a curvilinear relationship. Model 2 introduces the
squared knowledge distance term, but the findings are insignificant. Model 3 doesn’t
offer support for firm acquisition experience moderating the effects of knowledge
distance on equity participation, offering no support for hypotheses 7c and 8c. However, in
Model 4 we find partial support for 9c, in that there is a statistically significant difference
between our samples of EMNE and DMNE behavior in knowledge distant locations.
Knowledge distance increases equity participation for EMNEs more than for DMNEs (β
= 0.207, p < 0.01) as hypothesized.
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Table 20
Knowledge Distance and Equity Participation
Variables

Model 1
β

Model 2
β

Model 3
β

Model 4
β

Controlsa
Acquirer Size
Deal Value
Domestic Acquisition Experience
Cross-Border Acquisition Experience
Geographic Distance

-0.125**
0.096**
0.009
-0.042
0.005

-0.123**
0.103**
0.012
-0.047
-0.013

-0.123**
0.104**
0.010
-0.044
-0.013

-0.137***
0.058***
0.036
-0.150***
-0.071***

0.160***

-0.074
0.249

-0.073
0.250

-0.795***
0.941***

0.005
-0.006

-0.002
0.046
0.207***

3.924***
0.161
0.004

16.296***
0.185

Predictor
Knowledge Distance
Knowledge Distance Squared
Moderators
Domestic Acquisition Experience x Knowledge Distance
CBA Experience x Knowledge Distance
MNE Classification x Knowledge Distance

F
Adjusted R2
F for Change in R2

4.256***
0.163

4.194***
0.165
2.071

EMNE Sample (Models 1-3): N = 503; DMNE Included (Model 4): N = 2365;
a
Control Dummies for Year, Country, and Industry are not shown in table for ease of presentation
Change in R2 for Model 2 is with respect to Model 1, and Model 3 is with respect to Model 2
* p < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
The emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China have been a major source
of cross-border acquisitions during the recent global recession, spurring the need for
increased scholarly investigation into the antecedents and deal characteristics of this form
of internationalization by Emerging Market Multinational Enterprises (EMNEs).
Furthermore, extant literature posits that new theories are needed to explain the EMNE
internationalization process as the behavior appears to be fundamentally different from
that of traditional MNEs from the developed world (DMNEs). This dissertation offers
empirical evidence on both accounts by analyzing all cross-border acquisitions by
publicly traded EMNEs from Brazil, Russia, India, and China for the last 11 years (20002010) and then comparing the findings to a parallel sample of cross-border acquisitions
by publicly traded MNEs from a major developed country.
Institutional theory holds two important tenets for cross-border acquisitions. First,
the theory suggests that the institutional context of the home country will influence the
strategic orientation of MNEs originating there. Second, it suggests that MNEs must
conform, to some degree, with the institutional context of the host country to earn
legitimacy (i.e., the pressure of isomorphism). Thus, differences between the institutional
frameworks of the home and host country (i.e., institutional distance) are theorized to
decrease the ability of MNEs to successfully complete acquisitions and will increase the
time it takes to complete announced deals (Dikova et al., 2010). Including cultural
dimensions in an institutional analysis helps give a fuller understanding of the formal and
informal institutional effects on MNE cross-border acquisition behavior (Leung & Ang,

86

2009). Thus, building on the recent work on institutional distance by Berry et al. (2010),
this dissertation has explored how sub-dimensions of institutional distance Administrative, Economic, Financial, Political, Cultural, and Knowledge - affect the
completion rate and duration of EMNE cross-border acquisitions.
Furthermore, EMNE specific internationalization literature suggests that these firms
are more aggressive, proactive, and risk taking than DMNEs (Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo &
Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006). These perspectives suggest that the effects of
institutional distance may be less negative, and in some cases positive in effect, than what
is found within a sample of cross-border acquisitions by DMNEs. Specifically, it would
seem that certain dimensions of distance, in particular those that would help compensate
for the institutional voids said to be present in Emerging Markets (Khanna & Palepu,
2006), would actually increase the chances that EMNE cross-border acquisitions are
completed, shorten duration of the acquisitions, and increase acquisition aggressiveness
in general. Specifically, since EMNEs generally look to acquire strategic assets abroad in
institutionally distant locations (Kedia et al., 2012), they will prefer to have greater
control over the assets and will thus pursue a larger ownership stake (Equity
Participation).
A EMNEs previous acquisition experience (domestic or international) would also be
expected to lessen the negative effects of distance, as the particular EMNE becomes more
comfortable and skilled with cross-border acquisition deal making. Furthermore, the subdimensions of institutional distance should have less effect on EMNE cross-border
acquisition outcomes than DMNEs, as they are more aggressive in their
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internationalization behavior and may be less inclined to see institutional distance as a
negative (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002, 2006).
General Findings
None of the sub-dimensions of institutional distance were found to have a significant
effect on EMNE acquisition completion rates. This was somewhat surprising as recent
research (Dikova et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011) found significant relationships between
different proxies of institutional quality and acquisition completion rate. However, both
previous studies had a larger sample than the EMNE sample used in this dissertation.
This may have reduced the power to detect the nuanced relationships. Furthermore, after
revisiting Dikova et al.’s (2010) study, I see that they also had trouble finding significant
effects on acquisition completion as well. Several of their main hypothesis were only
supported at p < 0.10. This may mean that while an important outcome variable,
acquisition completion may be difficult to predict. One potential limitation may be that
many acquisitions are only publicly announced when the parties are somewhat certain
that they have a high chance for completion, understating the real chances of failure.
Four institutional sub-dimensions - economic, financial, cultural, and knowledge
distance - had a significant negative effect on acquisition duration. As predicted, more
economically, financially, and knowledge distant locations facilitate the EMNEs
acquisition process, shortening duration. This suggests that better institutions may, unlike
the institutional voids present in emerging markets, improve the ability of EMNEs to
complete deals in a timely fashion. However, the most interesting finding was that the
relationship between culture and duration was found to be the opposite of what was
hypothesized. In other words, culturally distant locations also decreased acquisition
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duration for EMNEs. This is surprising as cultural distance would be assumed to increase
the chances for miscommunication that might slow the process. Perhaps culture’s
significant correlation with indicators of institutional quality caused the unexpected
finding. Administrative distance had a significant positive effect on duration, as
hypothesized. Recent research has found that cultural distance has a curvilinear
relationship (U shaped) with various cross-border acquisition outcomes (Malhotra et al.,
2011), thus I test for curvilinear relationships. In the case of acquisition duration,
knowledge was found to have a U-shaped effect, meaning that as knowledge distance
grows from small to moderate distances acquisition duration falls. However, from
moderate to high levels of knowledge distance, acquisition duration increases.
Economic, political, cultural and knowledge distance were found to have a
significant positive effect on EMNE cross-border acquisition equity participation, though
cultural and political distances were hypothesized to have a negative relationship.
Perhaps these counter intuitive findings reflect the desire of EMNEs to gain greater
control over firms when they are in countries with culturally or politically distant
institutions. Furthermore, economic distance is found to have a curvilinear inverted Ushaped relationship with equity participation. Meaning equity share has a positive
relationship with economic distance to a point, but then becomes sharply negative as the
level of economic distance climbs from moderate to high levels.
In regards to the moderating effect of firm acquisition experience on the three
dependent variables, there was minimal support found in the study. The sole significant
finding was that cross-border acquisition experience was found to positively moderate the
link between knowledge distance and acquisition duration, but this was opposite of what
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was hypothesized. While it is surprising that previous acquisition experience, domestic
or international, did not reduce the effects of institutional distance on EMNE cross-border
acquisition outcome, this may hold an interesting implication for EMNE-specific
Internationalization Theory. Perhaps the lack of findings supports the notion that
EMNEs are more aggressive and risk taking in their international acquisitions, negating
the effect of previous experience.
With the exception of financial distance, there was no support for a statistical
difference in how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance alter acquisition
completion for EMNEs and DMNEs. However, all six sub-dimensions – economic,
financial, political, administrative, cultural, and knowledge distance – are shown to affect
EMNE acquisition duration differently that they do DMNEs. Similarly, with the
exception of administrative distance, the sub-dimensions were shown to have a
significantly different effect on EMNE equity participation than for DMNEs. This is the
most interesting finding of the entire dissertation in that it provides direct evidence that
EMNEs are different from DMNEs.
Implications
While some implications become clear in the previous section. There are additional
implications of this dissertation for the research stream. Overall, this dissertation
contributes to the extant literature by offering evidence that EMNE cross-border
acquisition behavior is affected differently by institutional differences between the home
and host country than traditional MNEs from developed countries. Thus, it offers
empirical support to EMNE specific FDI theories that suggest EMNEs internationalize
differently than MNEs from the developed world.
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Furthermore, this study not only suggests that EMNE cross-border acquisition
behavior is affected differently, but explores how it is varies. Specifically, the effects of
institutional distance on EMNE cross-border acquisition outcomes (Completion,
Duration, and Equity Participation) vary based on what sub-dimensions of distance are
being tested (Administrative, Economic, Financial, Political, Cultural, and Knowledge).
More importantly, the effects on EMNE cross-border acquisition outcomes are often
positive, which is opposite of what is predicted by the vast majority of extant institutional
distance literature. This not only suggests that EMNEs are often not deterred by
institutional differences, but that some differences might actually make them more risk
taking. This coupled with the findings that previous acquisition experience (domestic
and international) has minimal effect on these EMNE cross-border acquisition outcomes,
again offers support for EMNE specific FDI theories that suggest EMNEs are more
aggressive in their internationalization behavior than DMNEs.
Thus the institutional context of Emerging Markets or the “Institutional Voids”
(Khanna & Palepu, 2006) that are often present, create a counter intuitive motivation for
EMNEs. They seek acquisitions in locations that are institutionally different from the
home country context. The institutional context of developed countries, provide
intellectual knowledge protection, more robust and stable economic, financial, political
institutions which facilitate acquisitions, decreasing duration. Furthermore, since EMNEs
are argued to seeking strategic assets in more developed countries in an effort to learn
(Kedia et al., 2012), these firms take a higher equity share (equity participation) in these
deals to increase control and the ability to harness these assets and capabilities.
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Theoretically, these findings offer support for EMNE specific FDI theory explain
how and why EMNEs are internationalizing in a way that seems fundamentally different
than MNEs from the developed world (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Peng, 2003).
These perspectives – LLL, Springboard, and Ambidexterity – each suggest that
EMNEs differ from traditional MNEs in one key respect: the accelerated pace of EMNE
internationalization, in order to develop and/or acquire the capabilities necessary to
compete on a global level. Factors such as institutional deficiencies, non-competitive
industries, and/or a lack of a lucrative domestic consumer market push EMNEs to seek
capabilities outside of their home borders through aggressive strategic
internationalization that often targets mutually beneficial partnerships and acquisitions
that provide access to new knowledge and skills. The pursuit of these competencies often
requires the firm to pursue multiple aggressive goals and strategies, which often conflict,
in an effort to achieve global competitiveness.
Implicit in these three perspectives is that EMNEs are dealing with changing rules to
competition at home (i.e., institutional transitions) and are being forced to adapt in order
to survive. Thus their need to engage in proactive and risky investment in an effort to
catch up with established competitors. The effects of these shifts in the norms, values,
and regulatory environments of developing countries has been shown to have an impact
on the nature of organizational transactions (i.e., from relationship based to rule based)
(e.g., Peng, 2003), as well as on the mentality of individuals and firm level strategic
orientation (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Aulakh & Kotabe, 2008; Bruton et al., 2010;
Kreiser et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2010; Mathews & Zander, 2007).
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Thus, these EMNE-specific internationalization theories suggest that EMNEs are
different from MNEs from the developed world because they more aggressive during
internationalization, of which cross-border acquisitions are an increasingly visible form.
Since EMNEs are argued to have a need to pursue aggressive internationalization, then
perhaps these firms would be less affected by institutional differences, many of which are
an improvement. This is counter the traditional thought on institutional distance as a
deterrent of cross-border acquisition risk, but this is because EMNEs start from a
relatively opposite perspective. They are looking to escape institutional voids, while
DMNEs are looking to mitigate risks in institutionally different, and assumed poorly
institutional quality.
Furthermore, the effects of distance are more nuanced than can be deciphered
through an aggregate measure of institutional distance. Thus, I join Berry et al. (2010) in
examining specific sub-dimensions of distance in this new context of EMNEs to gain a
fuller understanding of how unique aspects of distance may affect the characteristics of
EMNE cross-border acquisitions. Six of their sub-dimensions are hypothesized to have a
direct effect on the dependent variables of interest (Administrative, Economic, Financial,
Political, Cultural, and Knowledge Distance), and a seventh is used as a control
(Geographic Distance). These sub-dimensions of institutional distance are empirically
verified and theoretically separate, and offer a more nuanced understanding of the
broader concept, which more accurately depicts when, how, and why institutional
distance matters in the context of EMNEs, and MNEs broadly.
Investigating acquisition completion and acquisition duration is a relatively new
outcome variable within cross-border acquisitions (Dikova et al., 2010; Zhang et al.,

93

2011). While a relatively simple measure, the dichotomous completion variable is
important because unlike most outcomes that are post-acquisition (e.g., value creation),
completion looks at the pre-completion stage of acquisitions. This stage is important, as
Holl and Kyriazis (1996) found that up to 25% of announced acquisitions are abandoned,
which has real costs for companies (Luo, 2005; Rosenkranz & Weitzel, 2005). Similarly,
the duration from acquisition announcement to completion also is accompanied with
increased costs and negative perceptions. Thus, while institutional distance has been
found to decrease the chances of acquisition completion and increase the acquisition
duration in developed multinationals (Dikova et al., 2010), EMNE specific
Internationalization Theory would suggest that institutional distance may not be as
important to EMNEs, who are engaging in proactive, aggressive, and risky acquisitions in
order to catch up with established global competitors (Luo & Tung, 2007, Mathews,
2006).
While this study did not find significant relationships between the sub-dimensions of
institutional distance and EMNE cross-border acquisition completion rates, perhaps the
lack of findings is interesting in of itself. EMNEs being less deterred by institutional
differences, and perhaps benefiting from these differences, may not decrease completion
rates as found in previous studies (e.g., Dikova et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2011).
Furthermore, the Dikova et al. study was based on DMNEs, which may be different from
EMNEs. However, this study failed to find a significant difference between the two
classifications in how the sub-dimensions altered completion rates. This however, might
be due to limitations in the sample that was used.
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Furthermore, it is important to measure how and when sub-dimensions of
institutional distance affect the aggressiveness of EMNE deals. A reasonable proxy that
captures this phenomenon is the equity share of the acquired firm sought during a crossborder acquisition (i.e., Equity Participation).
Equity participation has gained increased attention in the literature as an important
outcome in cross-border acquisitions, with variations of equity share sought in
acquisitions being driven by differing strategies (Chari & Chang, 2009; Chen & Hennart,
2004; Malhotra et al., 2011). While the entry mode literature has generally treated
acquisitions as either full or partial, and the latter as a form of joint venture (Barkema &
Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Das & Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1991;
Inkpen, 2001), the share of equity acquired in cross-border acquisitions varies widely,
with a significant number being partial and not full. The level of ownership taken in an
acquisition impacts many aspects of a firm’s strategy; such as control over the venture,
ability to transfer tacit assets, and risk exposure (Chari & Chang, 2009; Das & Teng,
2000; Pisano, 1989). Furthermore, it is not clear that partial cross-border acquisitions
should be treated the same as joint ventures. Entry through partial acquisition is not a
greenfield venture like traditional JVs (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Chen & Hennart,
2004).
Firms pursue different levels of equity participation in cross-border acquisitions
because of the perceived cost-benefit analysis of the increased control of higher levels of
ownership and the potentially reduced risk exposure of lesser ownership stakes (Inkpen,
2001). Shared ownership may increase the costs of partner opportunism, reduce the
firm’s ability to fully integrate the operations of the venture, and increase the difficulty of
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transferring tacit assets (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991; Kogut & Zander,
1993).
Recently, the effect of differences between institutions and cultures of the home and
host country has been shown to affect the level of equity taken in cross-border
acquisitions (Malhotra et al., 2011; Morschett et al., 2010; Richards, 2000). Malhotra et
al. (2011) found that cultural distance had a curvilinear relationship (U shaped) with
equity participation. Chen (2011) found that firms were more likely to opt for a larger
equity share in acquisitions when they are trying to acquire complementary capabilities.
Interestingly, Chun (2009) found that when intellectual property protection was low,
firms sought higher equity shares in acquisitions so as to protect their intellectual
property.
The findings of this dissertation extend this extant literature by offering evidence of
how the sub-dimensions of institutional distance increase the share of equity sought in
EMNE cross-border acquisitions. Specifically, the fact that EMNEs take a larger equity
share in countries that offer greater protection of knowledge and are economically,
financially, politically, culturally distant to the home country is interesting. Even more
interesting is that there is a statistically significant difference in how these five subdimensions affect EMNE equity participation as compared to a sample of DMNEs.
EMNEs seek a larger equity share in these type deals in institutional distant locations
than their DMNE counterparts.
Limitations
Several limitations of this study have been touched on in earlier sections, but there
are a few more general issues that should be discussed.
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Using the sub-dimensions of institutional distance that were designed by Berry et al.
(2010) is limiting in some regards because the underlying measures of each of the six
sub-dimensions used as independent variables are not always available for each country
pair and year. Thus for each regression the number of deals in which the sub-dimension
measures are available, and thus the distance between country pair could be calculated
fluctuated. These variations often removed smaller countries with limited cross-border
acquisition activity, but might decrease the clarity of interpretation of the findings.
Due to difficulties in acquiring the past acquisition experience variables for
acquirers, this dissertation only measured deals initiated by publicly traded EMNEs (and
DMNEs in the second sample). While these represent a significant portion of the overall
number of deals in the time period, the effects of the sub-dimensions of institutional
distance on the cross-border acquisition behavior variables may not fully capture EMNE
behavior as a good number of overseas acquisitions are initiated by firms that are
privately held or supported by governments.
The decision was made early on to only include cross-border acquisitions that were
large enough to be viewed as important. Thus, the decision was made to limit the
samples to deals that were valued at greater than $5 million (US) dollars. While
screening out smaller deals makes logical sense and is often done in the extant literature,
perhaps the floor was too high. Future research might be benefited by taking all deals
greater than $1 million, because this might capture more smaller acquisitions, many of
which might be limited investments that are meant to link to established players in an
effort to leverage the relationship into a learning opportunity for EMNEs (Mathews,
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2002, 2006). This concern might manifest itself by misstating the effect of the subdimensions of institutional distance on equity participation.
Another decision that was made early on to try and make the dissertation process
more manageable was to limit the number of countries in each sample. While the EMNE
sample included the four most active countries in this classification, the decision was
made to limit the DMNE representative sample selection to firms from the UK for the
purposes of this dissertation. The reason was the large difference between the number of
deals initiated by EMNEs (626) as compared to DMNEs (2844 - for just the UK). The
rationale is that UK is different enough from the countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, that it serves as a useful point of comparison. However, it is clear that the
generalizability of the results of the comparison is limited due to this decision. But, most
inference research suffers from the same issues, making decisions like this the norm in
our field. Future research should address these concerns by incorporating a larger, more
inclusive sample.
Finally, while it is commonly accepted within this specific literature that countries
such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China are often grouped together and classified as
EMNEs, this classification may be somewhat problematic. It is not entirely clear that the
differences between the BRIC countries aren’t larger than the differences from the
developed world. However, classifying EMNEs into one group is deemed useful because
they have similarity of context, in that they are going through market liberalization.
Recommendations for Future Research
This dissertation is a good starting point for many future avenues of research.
Specifically, future research should focus on how the effects of the sub-dimensions of
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institutional distance interact on the cross-border acquisition behaviors and outcomes
both included in this dissertation and those that are not. While this dissertation focused on
deal outcomes that have to do with deal success and deal characteristics, which while
important, leave many important antecedents and outcomes unstudied. For example,
recent work by Hope et al. (2011) on national pride as an antecedent of deal premiums
paid by EMNEs is very interesting. Other novel antecedents should be considered in the
EMNE context, using the sub-dimensions of institutional context as moderators.
Similarly, while fraught with issues, whether cross-border acquisitions in institutionally
distant locations create value for EMNEs, and whether these affect EMNEs differently
than DMNEs is a necessary step.
Furthermore, future research should further examine the nature of the relationships,
specifically whether they are linear. Economic distance is shown to have a curvilinear
inverted U shaped relationship with equity participation in cross-border acquisitions.
Evidence that distance is not always a linear relationship, but rather sometimes
curvilinear is supported in the previous finding that cultural distance has a curvilinear
relationship (U shaped) with equity participation (Malhotra et al., 2011). This finding has
potentially very important implications for theory and practice, and is an interesting basis
for future research. An important future pursuit is to understand why EMNEs decrease
equity participation as economic distance increases from moderate to high levels. Perhaps
EMNEs would desire high equity participation, but are unable to acquire large ownership
stakes in firms in highly developed locations for some reason. Similarly, Knowledge
distance was shown to have a U shaped relationship with acquisition duration. Suggesting
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low to moderate levels of knowledge decreases acquisition duration, but as this distance
continues to grow it slows down the acquisition process.
Building off the work of this dissertation Gaffney et al. (2012) examined how two
subcomponents of institutional distance – economic and knowledge – between the home
and host country affects equity participation by EMNEs in cross-border acquisitions.
While institutional distance has been shown to decrease the aggressiveness and equity
level taken during cross-border acquisitions by MNEs from developed countries (Pan &
Tse, 2000), they found that the effect of distance may be different for EMNEs.
Specifically, they found that the effect of distance may actually be positive. EMNEs
increase equity participation in cross-border acquisitions so as to gain greater control over
the target and acquire the capabilities they seek through the internationalization process.
This corresponds with the findings of Davis et al. (2000) who found that firms from
countries with relatively higher quality institutions were more likely to invest in wholly
owned subsidiaries, while those from relatively lower quality institutions tend to invest
through acquisitions, suggesting cross-border acquisitions will be a primary vehicle of
internationalization for EMNEs.
EMNE specific internationalization literature argues that EMNEs are more
aggressive, proactive, and risk taking than traditional MNEs when pursuing globally
competitive capabilities through internationalization (e.g., Luo & Tung, 2007). Crossborder acquisitions are common for firms seeking to develop capabilities (Chen, 2011).
In fact, EMNEs, which seek to acquire globally competitive strategic assets that they do
not possess internally (Luo & Tung, 2007), are increasingly prominent cross-border
acquirers (Hope et al., 2011). Gaffney et al. (2012) found support for this notion in that
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EMNEs are more likely to pursue higher equity participation in targets that are based in
locations that are more economically developed and protective of intellectual property.
EMNEs take a higher equity share in these locations to gain greater control over the
target and its assets, tangible and intangible. Greater control has been found to facilitate
the transfer of tacit assets (Chari & Chang, 2009; Das & Teng, 2000), which is a key
acquisition motivation of EMNEs (Kedia et al., 2012).
Conclusion
In conclusion, the contributions of this dissertation are: (1) to offer a richer and more
nuanced understanding of when and how institutional distance affects EMNE crossborder acquisition success and aggressiveness; (2) that these effects are sometimes
different for EMNEs than DMNEs; and (3) add a richer evidence-based understanding to
the developing EMNE specific internationalization literature which has been largely
theoretical.
The findings of this dissertation have important implications for EMNE research. It
was shown that several of the sub-dimensions of institutional distance do not deter
EMNE acquisition behavior as much as DMNEs. Furthermore, in many cases it increases
EMNE equity participation and decreases the duration of their acquisitions. This supports
the core of EMNE-specific FDI theory, which suggests that EMNEs are different from
DMNEs in that they are not deterred as much by institutional distance and make actually
may be benefited by institutionally distant locations.
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